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SECTION 301 AND THE PRIMARY
JURISDICTION OF THE NLRB
Michael I. Sovern *
Several labor cases recently decided by the Supreme Court have
brought into issue a conflict between the NLRB's primary jurisdiction over matters subject to sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA and
the doctrine that courts have jurisdiction to enforce collective
agreements. Professor Sovern discusses these cases and argues
that the Court properly decided that the principle of exclusive
NLRB jurisdiction should yield in suits on collective agreements,
but he criticizes the Court for not having articulated a satisfactory
rationalein support of this result. After an analysis of the doctrine
of preemption, he considers five types of labor-contract suits which
involve overlap between NLRB competence and court jurisdiction,
and concludes that in most instances courts should be permitted
to exercise their contract-enforcing function.
I.

THE PROBLEM

AT the October i96i Term, two notable doctrines of con.EItemporary labor law, long headed for a collision in the Supreme Court, finally met there.' One maintains that courts have
jurisdiction to enforce collective agreements; 2 the other that, as
stated in the second Garmon decision, "When an activity is
arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B., Columbia, 1953, LL.B., x955.
This is an expanded version of an address delivered on October 20, 1962, at the
Southwestern Legal Foundation's Ninth Annual Institute on Labor Law.
'See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 1o n.9
(x962); accord, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (x962); Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (x962).
'Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. x56 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ x85(a) (i958), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), sustained the constitutionality of this grant of power to the federal courts, and Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (x962), definitively established that § 3oi did
not deprive state courts of their concurrent jurisdiction over collective agreements,
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' Neither purports to

decide what shall be done when enforcement of a collective agreement is resisted on the ground that the "courts must defer to the
exclusive competence" of the NLRB because conduct involved
in the contract dispute is also "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of
the Act."
That these two doctrines cannot stand side by side without
major qualification has been painfully clear to the many courts
upon which both have been simultaneously urged. Consider, for
example, Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron
Works, Inc." The union, relying on section 301 of the Labor
'San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
This decision and its forerunners have been the subject of extensive comment. See
note 49 infra. The facts were simple enough: defendant unions picketed plaintiff
employers and sought to persuade their customers and suppliers to stop dealing with
them; the unions claimed that they picketed solely to persuade plaintiffs' employees
to join them, but the trial court found that the purpose of the picketing was to
compel plaintiffs to enter into a union-shop contract even though plaintiffs' employees had not selected defendant unions as their collective bargaining representatives; the trial court enjoined the picketing and other pressures and awarded
damages for losses sustained as a result of the unions' activity. The Supreme Court
of the United States, when the case first came before it, struck down the grant of
injunctive relief: the NLRA preempted California's power to enjoin the conduct
in question. However, the Court refrained from deciding whether California could
award damages under the circumstances because it was in doubt as to whether the
California courts had based the award of damages on state or federal law; instead,
it remanded for consideration of that issue. On remand, the California supreme
court stuck by its award of damages, resting it explicitly on state law, and was
reversed once again. The Court started from the proposition that "When it is clear
or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are
protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor
practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield." Id. at 244. Doubts about whether an activity is governed by
these sections, the Court proceeded, cannot be resolved by the courts, because the
NLRB is the tribunal to which such determinations are initially entrusted. Accordingly, since the activity at issue in Garmon was arguably within the scope of
section 7 or section 8, the California courts lacked power to deal with it. The
rationale of this decision and of others like it is explored at length below. See
section III infra.
4257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). See also Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956) ;
Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326 (6th
Cir. 1954); Local 774, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 185
Kan. 183, 341 P.2d 989 (1959); Post Publishing. Co. v. Cort, 334 Mass. 199, 134
N.E.2d 431 (1956); Elisco v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 387 Pa. 274, 128 A.2d 32 (1956).
Additional cases are collected in Christensen, Arbitration, Section 301, and
the National Labor Relations Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 411 (1962); Cummings,
NLRB Jurisdiction and Labor Arbitration: "Uniformity" vs. "Industrial Peace,"
12 LAB. L.J. 425 (i96i); Dunau, ContractualProhibition of Unfair Labor Practices:
Jurisdictional Problems, 57 Coarrar. L. Rav. 52 (I957); Note, 69 HARV. L. Rv.
725

(I956).
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Management Relations Act, invoked the doctrine that the courts
have jurisdiction to enforce collective agreements. It claimed
that the company had violated their agreement by refusing to
reinstate fifteen employees upon the conclusion of a strike and by
refusing to arbitrate the reinstatement issue. Accordingly, it
asked the court to order the company to arbitrate. The company
maintained, in effect, that since it had refused to reinstate the
fifteen because of strike misconduct, a decision that it had
erred in so doing would necessarily be a decision that it had interfered with legitimate union activity in violation of sections
8(a)(i) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act."
Accordingly, it invoked the doctrine that the NLRB has exclusive
jurisdiction over conduct "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the
Act."
In this case, the principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction
succumbed. After reminding its readers of the delays in NLRB
proceedings, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said:
"Certainly, if an otherwise arbitrable controversy happens also
to be an unfair labor practice, the parties should not be forced to
abandon their contract right and be relegated 'to the slow and
creaking procedure which, like a wounded snake, has dragged its
slow length along, sans bargaining, sans labor peace, sans everything but pride of opinion, ill temper and frustration.' ", However, as the Fifth Circuit recognized, it was not expressing a
unanimous view. Some courts had found a place in contract
actions for exclusive, or, as it is often called, primary NLRB
jurisdiction. 7 And that place had, of course, been made at the
expense of judicial power to enforce collective agreements.
' Section 8(a) (3), 6z Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § i58(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1962), makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization .... " Section 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 452 (I935), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(x) (x958), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7." Section 7, 6i Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), provides that:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities . . . ..
6 257 F.2d at 474.
7
E.g., International Chem. Workers Union v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.,
202 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Ill. 1962); International Union of Doll & Toy Workers v.
Metal Polishers Union, i8o F. Supp. 28o (S.D. Cal. ig6o); Benedict v. Limited
Editions Club, Inc., 265 App. Div. SI8, 39 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1943); Elisco v. Rockwell
Mfg. Co., 387 Pa. 274, 128 A.2d 32 (1956).
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To speak of judicial power to enforce collective agreements
is in one sense misleading. Even before the Supreme Court's
arbitration trilogy," most disputes over the meaning of contracts
were going to arbitrators, not judges; the Supreme Court merely
accentuated, or, as some would have it, aggravated the tendency.
Consequently, the main practical effect of applying the principle
of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction to the contract field would be
diminution of arbitral, not judicial, power. Nevertheless, whether
judges or arbitrators are wielding the power to enforce agreements does not materially influence the extent to which the
NLRB's jurisdiction should affect that power. The conflict remains one between the NLRA-enforcing power and the contractenforcing power, however the latter is divided between courts
and arbitrators. Accordingly, I shall continue to speak of the
courts as though they alone enforced agreements, with the understanding that I am doing so to avoid repetition of the cumbersome
"courts and arbitrators." 9
In Local z74, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,"° the
Supreme Court purported to settle once and for all the clash
between exclusive NLRB jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the
courts to enforce collective agreements. This time an employer
was invoking the power of the courts. The union had struck,
allegedly in breach of contract, to compel the employer to rehire
an employee who had been dismissed because of unsatisfactory
work. The union might have argued that the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB made judicial determination inappropriate,
for its strike was, without question, "arguably subject to § 7."
A strong case could be made for the proposition that the strike
was neither an unfair labor practice nor a breach of contract,
and if it was neither, the protection of section 7 attached. Al8 See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (Ig6o); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (ig6o); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (Ig6o).
' This is not, of course, to deny the differences between the judicial and arbitral
forums, nor is it to suggest that those differences have no bearing on the subject
under discussion. For example, those who believe with the Supreme Court (see
cases cited note 8 supra) that arbitrators are immeasurably wiser than judges in
their handling of labor problems might be willing to allow arbitrators, but not
courts, to invade the NLRB's province. On the other hand, if tribunals other
than the Board are to interpret the NLRA, it is at least arguable that judges,
trained in the law, are better equipped for the task than arbitrators, many of
whom have no legal training. To some extent, then, the differences tend to cancel
out. More important, as the text suggests and as will appear in detail below,
the considerations that should control the accommodation between contract enforcement and NLRA administration cut across the differences between arbitration and the courts.

10369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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though counsel for the union put the principle of exclusive NLRB
jurisdiction to other uses, he chose not to argue that it limits the
power of courts to enforce collective agreements.' He presumably would have fared no better had he made the argument, for
the Court disposed of it summarily. The entire discussion of the
point, relegated to a footnote, follows:
9 Since this was a suit for violation of a collective bargaining
contract within the purview of § 301 (a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, the pre-emptive doctrine of cases such
as San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,

based upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant. [Citations to lower-court cases
omitted.] As pointed out in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Court-

ney, 368 U.S., at 513, Congress "deliberately chose to leave the
enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of
the law.'" See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 8oth Cong., ist
Sess. p. 52. It is, of course, true that conduct which is a violation
of a contractual obligation may also be conduct constituting an
unfair labor practice, and what has been said is not to imply
that enforcement by a court of a contract obligation affects the
jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. to remedy unfair labor practices, as
such. See generally Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair
Labor Practices: jurisdictional Problems, 57 Col. L. Rev. 52.12
Those who sought to predict where the law of preemption was
going in the years before Garmon might be forgiven a prayer
of thanks on first sight of that footnote. They would not have
to live all over again, this time in the contracts area, with what
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, intending no irony, called "the process
of litigating elucidation." "I Their contract actions at least would
stay put. However, a sense of relief may be premature. One
commentator has already characterized footnote 9 as "a cryptic
aside," '" in which, if the Court is to be taken literally, it "has
come full circle and established in Lucas Flour what it condemned in Garner." '" He also questions the "necessity for such
a pronouncement in that decision, the rationale upon which the
'ruling' was based and the reach of the ruling itself .
," 1"
To judge by the literature antedating Lucas Flour' 7 and the
11 Brief for Petitioner, p.
12369

U.S. at iOI n.9.

24.

"International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 3S6 U.S. 617, 619 (z958).
14 Christensen, supra note 4, at 428.
11 Id. at 446.
'6 Id. at 41S.

27 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 4; Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration
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importance of the issues involved, additional criticism will be
forthcoming. If this criticism is well founded, it is most unlikely
that we have heard the last of Garmon in suits on collective agreements, the apparent firmness of the Court's footnote to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Court's failure to offer a reasoned defense of the position
taken in footnote 9 is troublesome. Although we may sympathize
with Justices weary of being told that they reached the right
result for the wrong reasons, 18 much of the criticism on this
score has been deserved. The response to be hoped for is better
reasoning, not an abandonment of the effort. The failure to
justify a decision that was hardly so obvious as to make justification unnecessary fairly invites doubts about whether the Court
has thought the problem through. This, in turn, gives rise to
uncertainty about the decision's reach and to skepticism about
whether it will be followed in the future.
The remainder of this paper attempts to do what the Court
should have done. It undertakes to sketch in some detail the
lines the Court will probably follow in future contract actions
when Garmon is urged upon it, for I believe that those lines
are now largely discernible, and it seeks to explain why the
direction in which the Court appears to be moving is, for the most
part, not only defensible, but virtually unavoidable. Where the
lines are not clear, the relevant considerations are stated and
tentative suggestions offered.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT's ANSWERS

In Lucas Flour, the Court obviously did not have before it
all of the possible varieties of overlap between section 3oi and
the NLRA. 19 It was not, for example, called upon to decide what
Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 3ox, 66 YALE LJ. 167 (1956); Note, 59
CoLum. L. REV. 153, 168 (1959); 74 HARV. L. REv. 622 (196x).

'8 This has been a major theme in three out of the last four annual reviews

of the Supreme Court's labor law decisions before the ABA Labor Relations
Law Section. See Cox, The Major Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court October
Term 1958, A.B.A. LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROCEEDINGS 23

(1959); Hays, The

Major Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court, October Term x959, A.B.A. LABOR
RELAT NS LAW PROCEEDINGS 74 (I96O); Summers, Analysis of Supreme Court's
Labor-Law Decisions, 5o L.R.R.M. 94 (1962) (to be published in more complete
form in A.B.A. LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROCEEDINGS (1962)).

' The preemption issue arises in labor contract actions in many different
contexts. Frequently, the conduct which is said to be in violation of the contract
may also arguably constitute an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., Cuneo Press, Inc. v.
Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d io8 (Tth Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
912 (1956) (plaintiff alleged that union struck in violation of no-strike clause
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shall be done when enforcement of a contract would arguably
compel the commission of an unfair labor practice. The obvious
illustration is a suit to enforce a union security agreement which
arguably exceeds the limits permitted by sections 8(a)(3) and
8 (b) (2).20
Since different kinds of overlap may call for different solutions, it becomes important to know the precise nature of the
overlap that did call forth footnote 9. The problem actually
before the Court required it to decide whether arguably protected
activity is subject to judicial restraint in contract actions. That
question arises in virtually every suit in which a union meets a
claim that it struck in breach of contract with a denial that its
work stoppage was prohibited by the contract sued upon. Since,
if the stoppage was not prohibited by the contract, workers participating in it would normally be protected from reprisal by
section 7, the union's claim of no contractual prohibition is also
a claim of statutory protection. If a court finds that the contract
did apply and assesses damages against the union, it may be
penalizing activity that the NLRB would hold protected,2 ' exactly
the sort of judicial "error" Garmon is supposed to guard against.
because of a work assignment dispute with another union, arguably an (8) (b) (4)
violation); United Ass'n of journeymen v. Marchese, 81 Ariz. x62, 302
P.2d 930 (956), clarified, 82 Ariz. 30, 307 P.2d IO38 (957)
(union demanded
modification of the agreement without complying with the provisions of 8(d),
arguably an 8(b)(3) violation); McAmis v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
273 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (discharge of employees because of union
activity arguably an 8(a)(3) violation); Elisco v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 387 Pa.
274, 128 A.2d 32 (19g6)
(relocation of plant arguably an 8(a)(3) violation).
Or the union may assert as a defense to a suit on a no-strike clause an antecedent
unfair labor practice by the employer. Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270 (I956). Sometimes defendant maintains that the contract provision
sued upon is illegal under the NLRA. See, e.g., Local 1898, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Brake & Elec. Sales Corp., 279 F.2d 59o (ist Cir. 196o) (defense
that compliance with the agreement would violate section 8(a) (3) ); Plumbers
& Steamfitters Union v. Dillion, 233 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. x958) (suit for violation
of implied condition to furnish labor; defense that the clause from which the
condition was implied was in fact an illegal closed shop provision); Park Inn
Hotel, Inc. v. Messing, 31 Misc. 2d 961, 224 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(defense that agreement was invalid because the union did not represent a majority at the time the agreement was signed). The preemption issue is also
relevant in, among others, disputes over the composition of a bargaining unit
covered by an agreement, see Local 1357, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Food Fair
Stores, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1961), and in actions on "no-raiding agreements," see United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.
i958).
"oE.g., Local x898, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Brake & Elec. Sales Corp., 279
F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 196o).
21 See H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. X122 (1952), modified, 213 F.2d 748
(ist Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954), modified, 115 N.L.R.B. 159i (1956).
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Even though arguably protected activity is involved in a contract
action in this way, Lucas Flour held the courts may proceed to
a full adjudication. No matter what other qualifications the Supreme Court may one day graft onto footnote 9, this holding will
remain unaffected, because, as we shall see, 22 no other is possible.
One cannot be quite so dogmatic when the problem takes the
special form of a defense that the no-strike clause was not violated because the union struck in protest against an unfair labor
practice. Judicial rejection of this defense not only risks penalizing protected activity, but, in addition, usually involves an interpretation of the NLRA itself as a step in the determination that
the employer was not guilty of an unfair labor practice. Although
this additional factor could conceivably have led to a different
result, the Court may have decided that it too is no obstacle to
judicial decision. Footnote 9 remains literally applicable and
the record does seem to have contained an arguably unfair-laborpractice strike.2 3 However, the question was most unobtrusive
in the record, the issue was not argued, and the Court gave no
sign of thought about it. We have, then, a decision which the
Court may not have been aware it was making, that an arguably
unfair-labor-practice strike may be adjudicated a breach of contract by the courts without waiting for an NLRB determination
of whether an unfair labor practice was involved or not.
Lucas Flourtakes us no further,24 except insofar as the breadth
22

See P. 559 infra.

23 Defendant's answer alleged that the discharge which provoked the strike

and plaintiff's "refusal to negotiate . . . was or reasonably appeared to the
defendants to be for the purpose of reducing the effectiveness of Local 174 in
representing its members and as a protest against the efforts of Local 174 to have
Welsch put to work, and as a punishment to Welsch for having sought the
assistance of Local X74 in this matter." Record, p. i5, Local 174, Teamsters Union v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). If these facts were established in an NLRB
proceeding, the company would, of course, be found guilty of an unfair labor
practice.
2
4 In arguing that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over the portion of
plaintiff's complaint sounding in tort, the union maintained that its strike was
arguably an unfair labor practice:
[lt would be viewed as an effort to terminate or modify the contract without complying with the requisite waiting period and notices. The Board
has taken the position that an economic strike in the face of a no-strike
agreement is an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (3) and § 8(d). United
Mine Workers Union and Westmoreland Coal Company, X17 N.L.R.B.
1072 (1957); United Mine Workers of America and Boone County Coal
Corp., x17 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), and see 9 Labor Law Journal 406 (1958).
Petition for Writ of 'Certiorari, p. 13, Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). However, the union conceded that
Enforcement of both of these decisions was denied by the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia by a decision divided two to one. Local 9735
UM.W. v. N.L.R.B., 258 F.(2d) 146 (App. D.C. 1958) ; International Union,
U.M.W. of A. v. N.L.R.B., 257 F.(2d) 211 (App. D.C. 1958).
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of the footnote suggests a general lack of receptivity to the argument that jurisdiction over a contract action is lacking because
some aspect of the case is grist for the NLRB's mill. However,
additional clues are to be found in three other cases decided at the
same term.
25
The first of these was Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
well known for its holding that section 30I's grant of jurisdiction
to the federal courts did not preempt the state courts of their
power to enforce collective agreements. Although the case purports to have decided only that question, an overlap with the
Board's jurisdiction was brought forcefully to the Court's attention. Indeed, the Court's own statement of the facts respecting
defendant-employer's breach does everything but actually apply
the label of arguable refusal to bargain. The employer's representatives, after a number of sessions with the union's representatives, had signed a "Stipulation" containing some new benefits
including wage increases, as well as provision for continuation
of many clauses from an earlier agreement. Then, the Court reports,
The petitioner originally announced to its employees that it
would put into effect the wage changes and other provisions
covered by the "Stipulation" and draft agreement, but a few
weeks later notified its employees of its intention to terminate

these changes and return "to the rates in effect as of May 18,
1957." It was the petitioner's position that its bargaining representatives had acted without authority in negotiating the new
agreement, and that the union had been
so advised before any
26
contract had actually been concluded.
On these facts the General Counsel to the Board would not
hesitate to issue a refusal-to-bargain charge. Nor was the employer ashamed to make that point. In its brief in the Supreme
Court it argued that, "The conduct of the petitioner, complained
of by the plaintiffs in the lower court action, if established to be
true, constituted an unfair labor practice. This Court in prior
decisions has held that state courts cannot in these circumstances
rd. at xi n.6. If the union's contention is well founded, Lucas Flour also involved
an overlap between a contract breach and an arguable unfair labor practice.
Fortunately, we need not dwell on how arguable an unfair labor practice must
be in order to be "arguable" within the meaning of the Garmon formula, for
the case next discussed in the text tells us what we wish to know about the
contract breach that is also arguably an unfair labor practice.
25368 U.S. 502 (1962).
26
1 d. at 504.
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exercise jurisdiction." 2 The elaboration of this argument turned
out to be rather unorthodox. In essence, the employer contended
that the presence of an unfair labor practice ousts the state courts
of their contract-enforcing power even though it does not have
the same effect on the federal courts. s Although the use to which
the employer put the information was unusual, it remains true
that the Court was reminded that the contract breach was an
arguable unfair labor practice and that this might make Garmon
relevant. The reminder was presumably driven home by the
answering arguments of both the union and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, appearing as amicus. Indeed, one
passage in the union's brief may well have provided the model
for the first part of the Lucas Flour footnote. Counsel maintained
that, "The cases holding that neither state nor federal courts
may act in the area over which the NLRB has jurisdiction are not
relevant

.

.

. Congress specifically decided not to make the

violation of a collective agreement an unfair labor practice, and
decided instead to leave such matters to 'the usual processes of
the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board.' "29
Whatever the Court said it was deciding in Dowd Box, it did
in fact allow the Massachusetts courts to enforce an agreement
even though the conduct constituting the breach of contract was
also arguably an unfair labor practice. Moreover, there is reason
to believe that the Lucas Flour footnote was a belated admission
of that fact. We have the similarity of footnote 9 to the union's
Dowd Box brief as one item of evidence. More important, footnote 9, for all its brevity, contains several indications that the
Court had been thinking about the contract breach that is also
arguably an unfair labor practice. To begin with, four of the five
lower-court cases cited in footnote 9 involved precisely that
problem. 0 In addition, when the Court turned to the effect
of its decision on the NLRB's jurisdiction, it told us about the
overlap between contract violation and unfair practice. Although
the relevant sentence appears in the full quotation above, it bears
27

2

Brief for Petitioner, p. 7.

11d. at

21-26.

Brief for Respondents, pp. 6-7; see Brief for the Wis. Employment Relations
Bd. as Amicus Curiae, pp. 14-i5.
30 See Local 4264, United Steel Workers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352
(ioth Cir. ig5g); Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works,
Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (I958); Independent
Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. i956);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem Constr. Co., X93 F.2d 470
(6th Cir. x95r).
20
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quoting again: "It is, of course, true that conduct which is a
violation of a contractual obligation may also be conduct constituting an unfair labor practice, and what has been said is not to
imply that enforcement by a court of a contract obligation affects
the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. to remedy unfair labor practices,
as such." 3' Finally, the one secondary source relied upon by the
Court was Bernard Dunau's excellent article, "Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems." 32
The title accurately describes the contents of the article: it deals
solely with the problem of conduct that is both contract violation
and unfair labor practice.
The next decision in the series was Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n
v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,3 3 a case that on first impression appears
to be little more than a fitting rebuff of an attempt by two
companies to evade a strike-settlement agreement. The strike
had been called against one of the companies after negotiations
for a renewal of existing contracts had reached an impasse.
Thirteen months later, a local mediation group succeeded in
getting the parties to agree to a "Statement of Understanding," in
which the unions promised to stop striking, the struck employer
promised to reinstate all strikers within a limited period of time,
and both employers made many of the promises typically found
in a collective agreement. These included, among many others,
wage and hour schedules, a ban on discharges except for just
cause, a pledge not to discriminate because of union activities,
a grievance procedure, and an arbitration clause. However, in
place of the customary recognition clause, the agreement provided
that the unions would not ask for recognition "unless at some
future time within the discretion of the" U unions, they were
certified by the NLRB after elections in single store units. Subsequently, the unions took a number of grievances arising under
the "Statement of Understanding" to arbitration. The ensuing
proceedings resulted in awards for the union on only two of the
grievances processed. When the employers refused to comply
with those two awards, the unions brought suit under section 3oi
to compel compliance. The district court decided that it lacked
jurisdiction because, as the Supreme Court interpreted its opinion,
an agreement between a union and an employer is enforceable
under section 301 only if (i) the union was the majority repre31369 U.S. at iox n.9.
32 57 CoLTum. L. REV. 52 (1957).

33369 U.S. 17 (1962).
Id. at 2x n.5.

34
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sentative when the contract was made and (2) the agreement is
a collective bargaining agreement; and neither of these conditions, according to the lower court, was met. In reversing the
court of appeals' affirmance, the Supreme Court rejected both
of these theories. Whether or not the "Statement of Understanding" was a collective agreement and whether or not the unions
were majority representatives, the federal courts had jurisdiction
to enforce the agreement.
The case seems an easy one. As the Supreme Court said, "If
this kind of strike settlement were not enforceable under §
301 (a), responsible and stable labor relations would suffer, and
the attainment of the labor objective of minimizing disruption
of interstate commerce would be made more difficult." 11 Nevertheless, Lion Dry Goods necessarily poses a difficult primary
jurisdiction problem. Less than a year earlier, in Bernhard-Altmann, 6 the Court had upheld an NLRB determination that a
minority union and an employer violate the NLRA when, instead
of entering into a members-only contract, they conclude an
agreement making the union exclusive representative of all of
the workers in a bargaining unit. That decision raises a serious
question as to whether the execution and implementation of the
"Statement of Understanding" violated sections 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (2)
and 8(b) (i). To be sure, Bernhard-Altmann held "the exclusive
representation provision . . . the vice in the agreement," " and
no such provision was included in the "Statement of Understanding," but Bernhard-Altmannwas presumably intended to do more
than teach minority unions to leave out the exclusive recognition
clause when they make agreements covering all employees. After
all, the Court also said: "The act made unlawful by § 8(a) (2)
is employer support of a minority union." 8 It is hard to conceive
of more impressive support than allowing a minority union to
negotiate an agreement applicable to all employees, even if
exclusive recognition is not accorded.
My purpose is not to try to determine the reach or wisdom
of Bernhard-Altmann. I mean only to demonstrate that there
lurked in Lion Dry Goods a substantial question as to whether
the Supreme Court was aiding plaintiff unions and compelling
defendant employers to participate in the commission of unfair
labor practices. We may then be able to learn, from the way in
35

Id. at 27.
ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (Y961).
id. at 736-37.
3
sid. at 739.
26
37
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which the Court dealt with that question, something more about
the reception it will accord Garmon in contract actions. Notice
that a determination of whether the execution and implementation of the "Statement of Understanding" constitute unfair labor
practices may require two questions to be answered. First,
were the unions majority representatives at the time the "Statement of Understanding" was concluded? And, second, if they
were not, was the "Statement of Understanding" an agreement
of the sort condemned by Bernard-Altmann? Garmon, if applicable in contract actions, would deny the courts the power to
enforce the "Statement of Understanding" until those questions
were answered by the NLRB; the appropriate procedure would
presumably be for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the
suit but to refrain from deciding it until the unfair-labor-practice
issues were resolved by the Board.
The Court appears to have rejected this mode of proceeding
in Lion Dry Goods. Admittedly, it did not purport to decide the
question, but having devoted an entire opinion to refuting the
lower courts' restricted view of their jurisdiction under section
301, the Court could not reasonably expect the district court
then to decide that it was still without jurisdiction because of the
exclusive competence of the NLRB. A conscientious district
judge would have to hold that this possibility was foreclosed,
that the Court had rejected it sub silentio, unless of course, he
was persuaded that the Court never saw the issue. That the Court
overlooked the point is not wholly inconceivable, for in one
passage it does seem to have been saying that its decision had
nothing to do with unfair labor practices. The Court said:
Only a few words are necessary to dispose of respondents' second
contention, that even if this agreement were otherwise within § 3oi
(a), petitioners' disclaimer of entitlement to recognition as exclusive representatives puts them out of court. This issue does
not touch upon whether minority unions may demand that employers enter into particular kinds of contracts or the circumstances under which employers may accord recognition to unions
as exclusive bargaining agents. 39
And yet to assume that the Court missed the point is to assume
almost total blindness, for the parties repeatedly argued the
unfair-labor-practice issue in their briefs. As early as their brief
in opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondents maintained:
29369 U.S. at

28-29.
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To hold that there was a contract here between these unions
and the employees would be a clear violation of the rights
guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 to be represented through representatives of their own choice or the right to refrain from engaging
in any activity involving collective bargaining through labor
organizations.
If these statements of strike settlement conditions were held to
be a labor contract between the employers and the Unions, both
would be guilty of violation of Sections 8(a) (i) and (2) and 8
(b) (i) (A) of the Labor-Relations Management Act [sic] by entering into a contract when the Union had not been authorized by
40
a majority of employees to act as their representative.
The theme recurs throughout the briefs, culminating in an entire
section of petitioners' reply brief on how Bernhard-Altmann is
to be distinguished.41
We must assume, then, that the Court perceived the relevance
of the NLRA to the contract problem before it and decided that
it was no barrier to decision. The question then becomes: When
a defendant maintains that enforcement of an agreement would
compel the commission of an unfair labor practice, is the court
to resolve the questions raised by that defense or is it to ignore
them and enforce the contract without regard to whether its
decision will oblige the defendant to violate the NLRA? The
Supreme Court seems to have opted for the latter view, at least
when resolution of the unfair labor practice issues would require
an inquiry into the union's majority status, for in Lion Dry
Goods it said: "Lastly, if the federal courts' jurisdiction under
§ 301 (a) required a preliminary determination of the representative status of the labor organization involved, potential conflict
with the National Labor Relations Board would be increased
• . . and litigation would be much hindered." 42 The point seems
fully applicable here, even though the Court made it in a somewhat different context.43
In sum, Lion Dry Goods seems to support the proposition that
in suits on collective agreements the courts are to ignore the
40 Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. i5.

41 Reply Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-11.
42369 U.S. at 29.

"The Court was demonstrating that contracts are not beyond the scope of
section 301 merely because they are not "contracts with exclusive bargaining
agents." Ibid. Members-only contracts and agreements made pursuant to NLRA
§ 8(f), 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § I58(f) (Supp. III, 1962), are given as
examples.
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defense that the union lacked majority support when the agreement was made. Judges are neither to wait for the NLRB to
determine the issue nor to decide it for themselves. Presumably
though, if the Board actually rules a contract an unfair labor
practice, its decision would supersede that of the courts.44
Lion Dry Goods plus Dowd Box and Lucas Flour make three
cases, each involving a different kind of contract-NLRA overlap,
in which the Supreme Court disdained Garmon. Three and a
half months went by before the Court had another chance to
reject Garmon in a contract action. Two sub silentio decisions
and a footnote had left the problem still seeking a place in the
text. It was not to be. In Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,45 an
even shorter footnote than that employed in Lucas Flour disposed
of the matter. The entire discussion follows:
The union also argues that the preemptive doctrine of cases such
as San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, is
applicable and prevents the courts from asserting jurisdiction.
Since this is a § 301 suit, that doctrine is inapplicable. Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, io n. 9.48

Beyond the fact of reaffirmation, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.
added nothing to its three predecessors. The suit overlapped the
NLRA only in that a court deciding whether a strike is in breach
of contract may, if it decides that question incorrectly, penalize
a strike protected by section 7.47 Lucas Flour had already decided that this danger is no reason to defer to the NLRB.
Four decisions 48 without an articulated rationale give little
"'This would follow from NLRA § io(a), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
16o(a) (x958): "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8)
affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law,
or otherwise . . . ." See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 9S, 1o n.9 (1962); cf. Duralite Co. v. Local 485, IUE, So L.R.R.M. 2556
(E.D.N.Y. 1962). In Duralite the NLRB had ordered the parties to cease and
desist from giving effect to their agreement because its execution constituted an
unfair labor practice; the court refused to enforce the agreement's arbitration
clause with respect to grievances arising after execution and before the cease
and desist order; according to the court, the agreement, in view of the Board's
decision, was "at worst invalid and . . .at best unenforceable . . . ." Id. at 2558.
4537o U.S. 238 (1962).

" Id.at 245 n.5.
47 However, as in Lucas Flour,in some sense it is also arguable that the strike
was an unfair labor practice. See note 24 supra, for the basis of that argument
and the reason for not exploring it further.
4 A fifth should be noted for the slight doubt it casts on the steadfastness
of the Court's purpose to keep the Garmon case out of the contract actions. In
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reason to hope that one will be forthcoming. We must, then,
begin at the beginning- with the rationale of preemption itself
-

and find our own way.

III.

THE RATIONALE OF PREEMPTION

For all the twists and turns the Supreme Court has taken in
working out the limits of preemption,49 and for all the difficulties
re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962), held that the Ohio courts had improperly adjudged
an attorney in contempt for advising his clients to ignore an injunction against
picketing. The injunction had issued ex parte even though the attorney had
advised the court that he was ready for a hearing at any time. Believing the
injunction to be invalid because of preemption and the absence of a hearing and
wishing to test its validity, the attorney advised his clients to continue picketing.
He was held in contempt, the court again acting without a hearing, and his efforts
to set that determination aside via habeas corpus failed. The Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the failure to accord petitioner a hearing before
holding him in contempt had denied him due process. In an effort to indicate
the function of such a hearing when petitioner had admitted urging disregard of
the court's order, the Court also declared that "a state court is without power
to hold one in contempt for violating an injunction that the state court had
no power to enter by reason of federal pre-emption." Id. at 692. This made
material the question whether the state court was preempted of its power to issue
the injunction in the first place. The answer to that question, the Court said, was
"impossible to determine from this record," ibid., even though the employer
argued that the injunction issued solely to enforce a no-strike clause in a collective
agreement. At first blush, this suggests that the Court may have entertained some
second thoughts about Lucas Flour, et al., and was willing to concede at least
the possibility that a contract action can be preempted. On closer analysis, however, it turns out that the Court probably meant only that it could not tell from
the record in the habeas corpus proceeding whether the injunction had issued
in aid of a collective agreement or not. The Court seems to have had in mind
an argument that would run something like this: since petitioner maintained that
no collective agreement had been properly executed, he was entitled to a hearing
to make that point; success would take the contract out of the case and thereby
demonstrate that the court lacked jurisdiction from the beginning; without
jurisdiction, its injunction was not entitled to respect and so petitioner could
not have been guilty of contempt for counseling his clients to disobey. This is,
in essence, the argument that provoked Mr. Justice Harlan to write a separate
opinion, in which Mr. Justice Clark concurred. On this reading, Green is entirely
consistent with a rejection of Garmon in contract actions, a conclusion buttressed by: (i) the absence of any charge in the Harlan-Clark opinion, which
builds in part on Lucas Flour's rejection of Garmon, that the Court was retreating from what it said in Lucas Flour; and (2) the fact that Atkinson's explicit reaffirmation of Lucas Flour came after Green was decided.
" The doctrine began with Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (I945), and reached
its zenith in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (i959).
A number of the cases on the subject are collected in the latter opinion, id. at 243
n.i. Among the best of the commentary stimulated by this line of decisions are
Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 957, 44 VA.
L. REv. 1057 (1958); Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law: October Term,
z959, 6o Cotur. L. Rav. 9oi (i96o); Hays, State Courts and FederalPreemption,
23 Mo. L. REv. 373 (1958); McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the
"No-Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 M'nw. L. Rav. 205 (1959); Meltzer, The
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courts have had with the concept, the preemption idea and the
reasons for it are really quite simple. The core of the idea, resting squarely on the supremacy clause, is familiar to lawyer and
layman alike-the states cannot set aside congressional enactments. Consequently, when, for example, Congress granted employees certain rights in section 7 of the NLRA, it preempted the
states of their power to deny those rights.
In some areas of law, preemption goes no further than this
displacement of state power to prescribe the controlling substantive principle. The enforcement of collective agreements may
turn out to be an example of this limited form of preemption.
Federal law governs the interpretation of collective agreements
and so the states may not apply inconsistent principles to them.o
But the states retain their power to enforce such agreements 51
they are merely obliged to apply federal law when they do.
In addition, even though federal law will award only damages
for many breaches, the states may be free to supplement that
remedy with injunctions."
However, preemption can go further. It can oust the states
of their power to provide supplementary remedies in support of
federally granted substantive rights, and, ultimately, of their
power even to decide cases involving such rights. Further still,
it can bar the states from deciding cases in which a federally
granted substantive right is so much as arguably involved. According to the Supreme Court, this full-blown version of preemption is what Congress desires with respect to sections 7 and 8
of the National Labor Relations Act, except, we are now told,
in suits to enforce collective agreements.
Why isn't it enough to preempt the states of their power to
deny federally granted substantive rights? Why must they also
be deprived of their power even to enforce those rights? The
classic answer is to be found in Garner v. Teamsters Union: 53
Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations pts. 1-2,
59 CoLum. L. ZEv. 6, 269 (1959); Wellington, Labor and the FederalSystem, 26
U. Cm. L. REv. 542 (1959).
"°Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (x962).
51 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (x962).
12 See id. at 514 n.8, where the Court expressly refrained from intimating any

view on "whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable to a suit
brought in a state court for violation of a contract made by a labor organization .

.

.

"

The Supreme Court said nothing further on the subject when it

decided in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. x95 (r962), that § 3oi did
not affect the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on federal-court injunctions against
strikes.
5 346 U.S. 485 (I953).
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Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law
to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to
the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and
application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted
tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation,
complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial
relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently
considered that centralized administration of specially designed
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely
to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward
labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity
of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting
54
adjudicationsas are different rules of substantive law.
In other words, the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB is
mainly a corollary of the preemption of state power to establish
substantive principles in conflict with the NLRA. Absent exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB, state tribunals, while purporting or attempting to apply federal substantive principles, might
in fact be misapplying them. The opportunities for misapplication are considerable, since factfinding errors as well as mistakes
in the interpretation of legal principles are possible. Either can
have the same practical effect as an outright refusal to apply
the substantive principles Congress has said shall control. The
same reasoning, although without nearly the same force, is applicable to the federal courts, for they too may be unsympathetic
or inept in applying the NLRA.
In addition to protecting the substantive principles Congress
has laid down, exclusive NLRB jurisdiction facilitates orderly administration of the NLRA. If courts cannot decide cases involving NLRA issues, they obviously cannot render decisions that
conflict with those of the NLRB. Moreover, the settlement of
NLRB cases, which must be encouraged lest truly interminable
delays result, might be inhibited if litigants saw some prospect
of doing better in another tribunal.
Exclusive NLRB jurisdiction thus serves important ends, but
the need for it should not be exaggerated. In all probability,
neither the NLRA nor its orderly administration would be subjected to wholesale subversion if state and federal courts were
left free to enforce the substantive rights conferred by Congress.5
54

Id. at 490-91. (Emphasis added.)
It should be recalled that in Garmon four members of the Court were
willing to allow the states to award damages for "nonviolent tortious conduct
which is not federally protected," even though it might be federally prohibited.
'5
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To begin with, since federal law is involved, review by the Su-

preme Court would serve as a partial check on lower courts. This
is, to be sure, an imperfect solution: the Court could hear only a
handful of cases and, even with respect to those, reversal would
normally come too late to be of any practical use. But the Su-

preme Court's guidance would still be important. Its determinations would control a great many subsequent lower-court decisions.
Any who doubt the Supreme Court's influence when it declares
what the federal labor law is need only contrast the way in which
lower courts have been herding cases to arbitration since the
Court handed down the "arbitration trilogy" "' with the innumer-

able judicial refusals to compel arbitration before the Supreme
Court spoke.57
Another point should be kept in mind. The NLRB sometimes
errs too. To prefer it to the courts is to assume that its mistakes
will be less frequent or less destructive of congressional policy
than those the courts make. I happen to be willing to embrace

that assumption, but many informed observers are not.i8 In
any event, preemption enthusiasts must recognize that exclusive

NLRB jurisdiction does not eliminate error; at best, it minimizes it.
We could, then, have viable federal regulation of labor relaSan Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 253 (1959) (concurring opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Clark, Whittaker and Stewart, JJ.). They
concurred in the result "solely because it is fairly debatable whether the conduct
here involved is federally protected .... ." Id. at 254. In DeVries v. Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co., 359 U.S. 498 ('959), the four justices apparently had
no difficulty in concluding that the activity in question was not protected; they
dissented from a per curiam reversal of a state damage award.
S6Cases cited note 8 supra; see Posner v. Grunwald-Marx,
Inc., 56 Cal. 2d
169, 363 P.2d 313, 14 Cal. Rep. 297 (296i) ; International Union of Elec. Workers
v. General Elec. Co., 148 Conn. 693, 174 A.2d 298 (i96i); In the Matter of
Borden Co., i5 App. Div. 2d 15i, 222 N.Y.S.2d 3o (1961); Application of Fownes
Bros. & Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 235, 218 N.YS.2d 764 (I96i); Application of Morten,
Inc., 216 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. i96i), aff'd per curiarn sub norn. Morton Karten,
Inc. v. Snow Suit Workers, 23o N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Div. 1962).
57

E.g., Pari-Mutuel Employees' Guild v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., x69
Cal. App. 2d 571, 337 P.2d 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); International Union of Elec.
Workers v. General Elec. Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 175, 149 A.2d 9IO (Super. Ct. 1959);
Textile Workers v. Firestone Plastics Div., 6 NJ. Super. 235, 7o A.2d 88o
(App. Div.), petition for certification denied, 4 N.J. 515, 73 A.2d 212 (1950);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, af'd per euriam, 294 N.Y. 529, 74 N.E.2d 464 (947).
" Some idea of how the "labor relations bar" regards the relative merits of
the Board and the courts is provided by the fact that the Labor Relations Law
Section of the ABA recently defeated by a margin of only four votes a proposal
to recommend that jurisdiction in unfair-labor-practice cases be taken from
the NLRB and entrusted to the federal district courts. See 48 L.R.R.M. 42 (I96i).
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tions without full-blown preemption. Indeed, limitations on preemption deriving from the Supreme Court's own construction of
it, from the Taft-Hartley Act, from Landrum-Griffin, and from
lower-court misunderstanding and resistance 11 make it clear
that we have in fact been operating without full-blown preemption. Thus, the Court has permitted the states to regulate conduct "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act" when such conduct
violates a sufficiently important local policy. In particular, states
have been allowed to assert jurisdiction over claims of violence
and mass picketing.6 ° This represents a significant departure
from preemption because an individual state judge's decision
about the point at which picketing becomes violent or massed
may obviously differ from the decision the NLRB would have
reached on the same facts. In any particular case, the difference
may mean the issuance of an injunction, an award of damages, or
even the imposition of criminal penalties as the result of activity
which the Board would have held protected by section 7.
The Court also seems disposed to treat suits to enforce the
duty of fair representation as an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, at least when the claim of unfair representation rests on alleged racial discrimination. 6' State and fed" The history of lower-court misunderstanding of and resistance to preemption
gives some reason to question the assertion, at note 55 supra, that neither the
NLRA nor its orderly administration would be subjected to wholesale subversion
if state and federal courts were left free to enforce the rights conferred by Congress.
Nevertheless, to generalize from the experience with preemption would be
hazardous. For one thing, the Supreme Court was extraordinarily confusing in its
pronouncements on the subject, leaving most observers, and not just judges, in
serious doubt about the direction the law was taking. For another, the temptation to flout preemption in cases over which the NLRB would not exercise
jurisdiction must have been uniquely compelling; indeed Congress ratified the
practice in 1959. See note 6g infra, and accompanying text. In many such cases
preemption would have meant denial of a remedy even though no serious
question existed about the plaintiff's substantive rights. Indeed, in some instances
plaintiff obviously had valid claims under both state and federal law. The fact
that in such cases state judges refused to withhold the state's protection when the
NLRB was denying the national government's solely because it was too busy does
not necessarily mean that state judges are not to be trusted with other federal
principles. The risks of generalizing from experience under such circumstances
are underscored by the fact that judges have intruded into the NLRB's domain
far less frequently since 1959, when preemption was clarified in Garmon and the
states were empowered to deal with the cases the NLRB was too busy to hear.
eo See International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl
v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. X31 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations

Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954).

"1See Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (i955) (memorandum decision);
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 CoLJM.
L. REv. 563, 608-13 (E962).
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eral courts apparently retain jurisdiction to compel unions to live

up to that duty, even though the activity allegedly violating it is
"arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act."
The Taft-Hartley Act included a substantial exception to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction in section 303. That section, as sim-

plified by the Landrum-Griffin Act, provides as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only,
in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor
organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an
unfair labor practice in section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States subject to the limitations and
provisions of section 3oi hereof without respect to the amount
in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the
parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the
62
cost of the suit.
This exception opens up to enforcement by both state and federal courts some of the NLRA's most difficult and sensitive provisions. Hot-cargo agreements, secondary boycotts, and work assignment disputes are among the troublesome concepts thus en-

trusted to the courts. Not only are inconsistent decisions by Board
and court possible, but they have in fact been rendered.
2 61

3

None-

Stat. IS8 (I947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (i958), as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (i959),

29 U.S.C. § I87 (Supp. I, 1962).

11 Compare NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., i98 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 9o6 (1953), with United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., i98 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952), in which the
court of appeals said:
We recognize that this finding is contrary to the finding in the companion
case of N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., No. 1II56, supra, in which the
Trial Examiner found that the picketing of the area of construction which
caused the cessation of work by the general contractors was on the part of
the Teamster's Union and not by the Appellants, which finding we have
upheld and on which we have based a ruling in that case. Under our existing system of courts, juries, administrative agencies, and appellate review,
such findings, even though inconsistent, are not invalid, and one does not
destroy the other. The two proceedings, even though arising out of the
same labor dispute, were heard by separate fact finding agencies. The witnesses in the two proceedings were not the same. The cross-examination of
some witnesses who testified in both proceedings was not by the same attorneys. Necessarily, the evidence produced in the different proceedings
by such testimony was not identical. Each fact finding agency was entitled
to make its own decision upon the evidence before it. Though this Court on
review recognizes the inconsistency, and may not be in accord with one of
the two rulings if it was making the ruling as a matter of original jurisdiction, it does not have the right to set aside such ruling, if, in the case of the jury
verdict, it is supported by substantial evidence, or, in the case of the Labor
Board proceeding, it is supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole. In our opinion, the respective findings are so supported in each of the two proceedings.
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it expanded

303 right along with it.

The Landrum-Griffin Act added still another major exception
to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction by amending section i4 of the
NLRA to permit state courts and agencies to act when the NLRB
declines "to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute . . . [be-

cause] the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction
,, 65

Finally, to some extent now but especially before 1959, the
year in which section 14 was amended to allow the states to deal
with "small" cases and in which the Supreme Court clarified the
preemption doctrine in Garmon, preemption was often inoperative because lower courts were unable to understand it or unwilling to bow to it. Writing in November 1958, Professor (as
he then was) Hays concluded: "[A] dding up the effects of ignorance and misunderstanding of the preemption doctrine, and what
in some cases seems to be a deliberate determination to grant
injunctions in spite of it, there is still, in practice, a large body
of labor activity which is subjected to state power." 66
In short, not only have we been operating with gaping holes
in the principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, but, in addition,
both Congress and the Court have indicated their willingness to
sacrifice that principle when to apply it would frustrate other
significant policies.
Id. at 642-43. Cf. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S.
573, 584-85 (ig6z) ("separate and distinct nature" of 303 and 8(b) (4) recognized
and a requirement of "substantive symmetry" between the two sections rejected) ;
International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244
(i951) (right to bring action under section 303 not "dependent on any prior administrative determination that an unfair labor practice has been committed").
64 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III, 1962).
es 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. III, 1962). Most commentators
on the subject have concluded that this amendment dispenses with federal preemption of substantive law as well. That is to say, state courts and agencies are
not only free to decide the cases declined by the Board pursuant to section 14;
in addition, they are free to apply state law to them. See, e.g., Aaron, The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 pt. 2, 73 HARv. L. REV.
io86, io97-98 (ig6o); Cox, The Landrum Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MnN. L. REV. 157, 262 (i959). But see, e.g., Hanley,
Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor's No-Man's Land: r96o, 48 GEo. L.J. 709,
721-35 (i96o); Papps, Section 70
and the State Courts: What Law To Be
Applied?, 48 GEo. L.J. 316 (1959). The state authorities seem to have taken
it for granted that they are to apply their own law. See, e.g., Cooper v. Nutley
Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. i89, 175 A.2d 639 (196i).
00 Hays, State Courts and Federal Preemption, 23 Mo. L. REV. 373, 382
(1958). For a recent example see Jafco, Inc. v. Liner, 49 L.R.R.M. 2585 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1962).
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IV.

WHAT ROLE IN CONTRACT ACTIONS FOR
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

It follows from what has just been said that the principle of
exclusive NLRB jurisdiction should yield in suits on collective
agreements if: (I) assuring an expeditious remedy for contract
breaches is as significant a policy as making a forum available
to those whose cases are too "small" for the NLRB, or as providing a judicial remedy, in addition to that available from the
NLRB, for victims of violence, mass picketing, unfair representation, hot-cargo agreements, secondary boycotts, or workassignment disputes; and (2) the policy of affording an expeditious contract remedy would be frustrated by applying the principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction. Condition (I) need not
detain us. Section 3oi amply demonstrates Congress' judgment
that the policy of enforcing collective agreements is comparable
in significance to the other policies just listed. 6 The Supreme
Court has discerned a similar commitment to arbitration as a
fundamental policy, 8 and fulfillment of that commitment is, of
course, dependent in part upon the enforceability of collective
agreements.
That condition (2) is also satisfied is equally clear. The NLRB
has no jurisdiction to enforce collective agreements as such.69
If they are to be enforced, the courts must do it. Consequently,
to say that the courts may not decide or must delay adjudication
of the many contract actions involving conduct "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act" would necessarily frustrate pro
tanto the policy of enforcing collective agreements.
Contract enforcement overlaps NLRA administration often
enough by coincidence to support the conclusion that wholesale
application of Garmon to contract actions would seriously impede the enforcement of collective agreements. Serious impediment could become near-total obstruction if parties chose to
617See, e.g., S. REP. No. xo5, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 17-18 ('947).

"8See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (196o);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (196o); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (i96o); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (i957).
11 See H.R. REP. No. 51o, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 41-42 (1947):
The Senate amendment contained a provision which does not appear in
section 8 of existing law. This provision would have made it an unfair labor
practice to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or an
agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. The conference agreement omits this provision of the Senate amendment. Once parties have made
a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be
left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board.
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exploit the possibilities of fabricating unfair labor practices to
defeat or delay contract actions. Almost any breach can, after
all, be brought arguably within the reach of sections 7 or 8. One
gambit, which could be used against uncertified unions, would
be to defend by questioning the union's majority at the time the
agreement was made.7" This would, as we saw in connection with
Lion Dry Goods, inject into the lawsuit arguable infractions of
8(a)(i), 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(i), all of which would be violated
by continued adherence to an agreement made by a minority
union. 71 Another tactic would have to be used against certified
unions: convert the breach of contract into an arguable refusal
to bargain. This technique could also serve as a second line of
defense against the uncertified union, and, with admirable evenhandedness, could be used by unions to defeat employer actions.
A contract breach can be converted into an arguable refusal
to bargain in a number of ways, but one example for each side
is sufficient to make the point. Management could shield its
breaches from judicial redress by refusing to discuss them with
the union. If management met a union attempt to invoke the
grievance procedure with the response that the subject was none
of the union's business, would not a court order compelling arbitration be directed against conduct arguably subject to section
8(a) (5)? 72 Unions, since their breaches usually take the form
of strikes in disregard of no-strike clauses, would probably find
another approach more congenial. They might seek to dress up
any dispute as an attempt to modify some aspect of an outstanding agreement.7 A court asked to decide whether the union had
defaulted on its no-strike pledge could then be met with the contention that it would have to pass on conduct arguably subject
74
to 8(b)(3) and 8(d).

The Supreme Court was right, then, to refuse to import Garmon
bodily into the contract field, for to do so might well cripple the
jurisdiction of the courts to enforce collective agreements.
"°See, e.g., Park Inn Hotel, Inc. v. Messing, 31 Misc. 2d 961, 224 N.Y.S.2d 179
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
71 See p. 540 supra.
72 Cf. Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401
(3d Cir. 1956).
"7No great effort is required. A union can convert any dispute over the meaning
of an agreement into an arguable attempt to modify that agreement by conceding
that the employer's interpretation is correct and then maintaining that the agreement should be altered to state the union's interpretation. By resorting to the same
tactic, an employer can claim that he has unilaterally modified the agreement,
thereby giving rise to an arguable refusal to bargain in violation of § 8(a) (5).
7' Cf. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (i957).
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However, this is not to say, as the Court did in Lucas Flour,
that Garmon "is not relevant" in suits on collective agreements.
In fact, a moment's reflection makes it perfectly clear that the
considerations that produced Garmon are operative in many contract actions. Otherwise, no conflict between exclusive NLRB
jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce agreements would exist. What is being suggested, to emphasize the
point, is that courts must be permitted to decide contract actions
involving conduct "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act,"
even though permitting them to do so risks an occasional decision
disserving rights protected by the NLRA and a modicum of disorder in administration, because a contrary rule probably would
emasculate section 301.

My difference with the Court's way of putting its rejection of
Garmon is not merely verbal. Its formulation blinks the fact that
something has been sacrificed to maintain full judicial power to
enforce collective agreements. More important, its formulation
purports to be definitive: courts enforcing contracts need no
longer be concerned with the NLRB's jurisdiction. The formulation suggested here, by recognizing that significant objectives
have been sacrificed, leaves open the possibility of a different outcome if in some special class of cases the need for exclusive
NLRB jurisdiction seems more compelling than the need for judicial enforcement of agreements.
Moreover, even if no special class of cases can be isolated and
we conclude that the NLRB never has exclusive jurisdiction of a
portion of a contract action, occasional instances may still arise
in which a court would do well to keep one eye on the NLRB. In
other words, the courts should in any event retain their discretionary power to delay decision when, for example, a controlling
Board determination appears imminent.
The remainder of this article is devoted to the search for a
class of contract cases to which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be applied. It seems appropriate to begin by asking whether Dowd Box, Lucas Flour, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., and Lion Dry Goods were properly decided in accordance
with the general predisposition against Garmon or whether any
of them exemplifies a class of cases deserving special treatment.
Accordingly, the next three subsections deal with: (i) conduct
which is claimed to be a contract breach but which is also arguably an unfair labor practice; (2) conduct which is claimed to
be a contract breach but which is also arguably protected by section 7; and (3) alleged contract breaches which can only be
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remedied by compelling the commission of an arguable unfair
labor practice. This discussion is followed by consideration of
two other kinds of cases that the Supreme Court almost certainly
did not have in mind when it wrote footnote 9: (4)cases in
which a union arguably lost its representative status after the
negotiation of a valid agreement; and (5) representation disputes
covered by no-raiding agreements.
A. Contract Breach and Arguable Unfair Labor Practice
I suggested above that the Lucas Flour footnote, for all its
succinctness, contains considerable evidence that the Court will
not retreat from the implicit holding of Dowd Box that the courts
are free to remedy a contract violation even though it is also an
arguable unfair labor practice .7 I now submit that the Court
should not retreat from Dowd Box. In other words, that type
of case should not be treated as an exception to the proposition
that exclusive NLRB jurisdiction must yield in contract actions.
Perhaps the point is sufficiently obvious to require no further
discussion. The contract breach that is also arguably an unfair
labor practice was, it will be recalled, the prototype that helped
us conclude that the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce collective agreements would probably be crippled if Garmon were held
applicable. Nevertheless, since this is far and away the most
frequent cause of overlap between contract and NLRA, and since
some have argued that Garmon should apply, 6 a little painting
of the lily may be forgivable.
Dunau's article, cited in Lucas Flour, makes the key point
well: "Perhaps the central support of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, however, is the lack of jurisdiction by the NLRB over contract violations as such. .

.

. [A]lmost never does a contractual

prohibition of an unfair labor practice exist without also implicating a part of the relationship between the employer and the
union which rests wholly on their agreement."7 7 If Dunau is
correct in the second sentence just quoted (he is, of course, in
the first), primary jurisdiction must yield. Otherwise, either of
two highly undesirable consequences would follow. One would
leave the victim of the breach without redress for the portion of
- See pp. 538-39 supra.
76 See, e.g., Stowe v. Aircooled Motors, Inc., 204 Misc. 228, 126 N.Y.S.2d 42

(Sup. Ct. 1953); Western Express Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 277
App. Div. 928, 98 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1950); Christensen, Arbitration, Section 3oz,
and the National Labor Relations Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 411 (1962).
7 Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 CoLrxa. L. REv. 52, 8o (1957).
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his contract claim not covered by the NLRA. This we can reject
out of hand, for Congress obviously did not intend to render unenforceable contract rights which offend no public policy and for
which an exchange of other valuable rights was presumably
given. We must assume, then, that the portion of the contract
claim not covered by the NLRA is to remain enforceable.
On that assumption, if preemption did not give way, the injured party could obtain complete relief only by going both to
court and to the NLRB. Even the Supreme Court, the conscientious guardian of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, has relented in
order to avoid requiring a party to pursue two wholly separate
remedies to vindicate his contract rights. InternationalAss'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales 78 presented exactly that issue for the
Court's consideration. Gonzales, claiming to have been expelled
from the Machinists in violation of its constitution and bylaws,
sued to compel restoration of his membership and to recover
damages resulting from the expulsion. The state courts granted
the relief requested, basing the damage award on lost wages as
well as on physical and mental suffering. The union did not
question the portion of the judgment requiring restoration of
membership, since the NLRB had no jurisdiction over this portion of the complaint. It did, however, contend that the state
courts could not award damages for lost wages and suffering.
If preemption is to conquer all, the union was plainly on solid
ground: an award for lost wages could only rest on a showing
that the union had caused an employer to deny the plaintiff employment because of his lack of membership, the very showing
required to establish a violation of section 8(b) (2) of the NLRA.
But the Supreme Court rejected the union's argument; it refused
to require the plaintiff to go to the state courts for his lost membership and to the NLRB for his lost wages. It said:
No radiation of the Taft-Hartley Act requires us thus to mutilate
the comprehensive relief of equity and reach such an incongruous
adjustment of federal-state relations touching the regulation of
labor.79
The Court went on to add two other arguments in support of the
result reached, but neither of them will withstand analysis.8 °
783 5 6 U.S. 617 (i958).

79 1d. at 621.
80 The first of these was: "If, as we held in the Laburnum case, certain state
causes of action sounding in tort are not displaced simply because there may be
an argumentative coincidence in the facts adducible in the tort action and a
plausible proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board, a state remedy
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To repeat, then, if Dunau is correct in his assumption that
contractual prohibitions of unfair labor practices almost always
give the promisee something more than the NLRA, the desirability of permitting enforcement of the right to that something
more, plus the undesirability of requiring a wronged party to
go to two separate forums for complete relief require the conclusion that primary jurisdiction must yield.
Let us now examine Dunau's key assumption. It is perfectly
clear that some suits to enforce collective agreements involve both
an arguable unfair labor practice and something more. A simple
example might arise from the dismissal of an employee for distributing union leaflets. The union demands arbitration, invoking
two contract clauses, one barring discrimination for union activity, the other barring discharge except for just cause. If the case
were put to the NLRB, it could do nothing for the employee unless
the employer had violated 8(a) (i) or 8(a) (3). The contract,
however, gives something more; reinstatement would be proper,
even though the employer committed no unfair labor practice,
if the arbitrator were persuaded that the leaflet distribution in
question was not "just cause." "I Dunau offers a number of other
examples,2 but he has set himself an impossible burden of perfor breach of contract also ought not be displaced by such evidentiary coinidence when the possibility of conflict with federal policy is similarly remote."
Ibid. Laburnuin, of course, was subsequently limited to instances "of conduct
marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order." San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). If Gonzales had in fact
been decided on the basis of its similarity to tort actions, Garmon should have
ended its influence; Garmon instead expressly approves Gonzales. Id. at 243-44.
The other argument offered in Gonzales was that the award of damages presented no greater risk of conflict with the Board than did the order restoring
Gonzales to membership. This simply is not true. As the Court itself recognized,
the Board has no jurisdiction over the membership question; it does, however,
have jurisdiction to decide the very same issues that the state courts considered
in making the damage award. Garrnon's attempted explanation of Gonzales as
a case in which "the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act," id. at 423, is no more convincing. If this is a
reference to the membership question, it is true but does not explain the award
of damages. If it is a reference to the award of damages, once again it is not
true, for the award of damages is based on the resolution of issues that are
central to the NLRA.
81 E.g., Lodge 12, Int'l Assn of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257
F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); Post Publishing Co. v.
Cort, 334 Mass. i99, 134 N.E.2d 431 (1956); McAmis v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co., 273 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
82 Dunau, supra note 77, at 68-79. Consider, for example, the difference between the Board's and an arbitrator's "remedial authority," as Dunau calls it.
Id. at 69. He means by this that an arbitrator usually has the power to decide
whether the penalty imposed upon an employee is excessive "in the light of the
numerous factors pertinent to the assessment of punishment -length
of service,
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suasion. One cannot demonstrate, without an exhaustive and expensive canvass, that "almost never does a contractual prohibition of an unfair labor practice exist without also implicating
a part of the relationship between the employer and the union
which rests wholly on their agreement." 83
Fortunately, a conclusive demonstration of the point turns out
to be unnecessary. It is enough that the phenomenon occurs frequently, and it undeniably does. Common occurrence is sufficient
because of the difficulty, indeed typically the impossibility, of deciding on the basis of the pleadings that an unfair labor practice,
no more and no less, is the subject of a contract action. Collective
agreements do not usually quote the NLRA, even when our reading of them may persuade us that the parties intended essentially
the same protection. Normally, then, either party is free to argue
that something different from the NLRA was intended and only a
decision on the merits can refute that argument. Indeed, even
when a contract clause is in all respects indistinguishable from
the NLRA, the parties may still contemplate a different construction. Again, only a determination on the merits can resolve
the matter. Consequently, if the courts attempted to defer to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB only when a contract gave no
more than the NLRA, the result would be a system of contract
enforcement that left plaintiffs in doubt as to their proper forum
until after a trial on the merits. The price of error would be no
relief whenever the judicial proceeding lasted longer than the sixmonth limitation period of the NLRA,s4 unless plaintiff took the
precaution of proceeding before the Board as well as in the courts.
Finally, a standard that required the courts to defer to the
NLRB whenever a contract merely duplicated the NLRA's protection would be an irony indeed. It would require the courts,
whenever the primary jurisdiction point was raised, to construe
the NLRA, the very practice Garmon is supposed to avoid.
Since contract rights going beyond the NLRA are involved in
a substantial proportion, perhaps the overwhelming majority, of
contract actions seeking relief against conduct that also arguably
constitutes an unfair labor practice, the best course is to permit
past conduct, extenuating circumstances, the relationship between the gravity of
the offense and the severity of the punishment, and the like." Ibid. The Board,
on the other hand, normally lacks the power to make such an inquiry. Although
Dunau speaks of this as a remedial matter, it is, in fact, a difference in substantive protection. The contract as construed by arbitrators limits management's
right to dismiss a worker more severely than the NLRA does.
83
Id. at So.
8461 Stat. 146 (i947), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(b) (,958).
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courts and arbitrators to decide all such cases. What the Supreme
Court said in Garmon is also applicable here: "The nature of the
judicial process precludes an ad hoc inquiry into the special problems of labor-management relations involved in a particular set
of occurrences in order to ascertain the precise nature and degree
of federal-state conflict there involved, and more particularly
what exact mischief such a conflict would cause. .

.

. Our task

is confined to dealing with classes of situations." " In Garmon,
this approach led to preemption; in the contract context, for the
reasons already suggested, it leads in the opposite direction. 6
81359 U.S. at 242.
86 Several other arguments offered in support of judicial power to remedy a
contract breach that may also be an unfair labor practice should be evaluated.
Perhaps the most seductive of these was nicely dispatched by Dunau:
To the extent that it [Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956)] implies that jurisdiction exists simply because
the source of the right asserted is the contract and not the NLRA, it is
clearly wrong. The NLRB's jurisdiction is exclusive, not merely because
the source of right asserted in the other tribunal is the NLRA itself, but
because the other tribunal is asked to exert its power over a subject regulated by the NLRA regardless of the source of the right there asserted.
Dunau, supra note 77, at 76. However, Dunau himself appears to have been taken
in by another delusive argument. He seems to give considerable weight to the
NLRB's own rejection of the idea that it has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with
conduct that is both unfair labor practice and contract breach. See id. at 59-64. It
is certainly true that, far from insisting that other tribunals defer to it, the Board
has on many occasions deferred to the arbitration process. E.g., Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. io8o (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 1o9 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954);
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (I951); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70
N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, i61 F.2d 949 (6th
Cir. 1947). The conditions under which the Board will exercise its discretion
to decline to act because of an outstanding arbitration award or the availability
of arbitration have been commented on extensively. In addition to Dunau, see,
e.g., Levitt, Interrelationships in the Interpretation of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, io LAB. L.J. 484 (1959); Wollett, The Interpretation of Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Who Should Have Primary Jurisdiction?, io LAB.
L.J. 477 (1959). Admittedly, abstention by the Board reduces the chances of
actual conflict between Board and court or Board and arbitrator, and this is
important, but so would denying courts and arbitrators the power to remedy
contract breaches that may also be unfair labor practices. Why prefer Board
abstention? This is just another way of asking the question with which we began:
should courts and arbitrators be permitted to proceed here? The fact that the
NLRB says they should adds little, particularly since the Board is not the appropriate forum to decide the power of the courts.
Dunau makes the common error of implicitly attacking the rationale later used in
Garmon while claiming to be distinguishing it. He suggests that when parties are
having a dispute that may be both a contract breach and an unfair labor practice,
arbitration is preferable to the NLRB because either party can invoke arbitration without having to persuade the General Counsel to issue a complaint. Dunau,
supra note 77, at 68. However, this obviously makes a tort action preferable
to the NLRB too; the Supreme Court nevertheless closed the courts to tort
plaintiffs complaining of conduct that arguably constitutes an unfair labor
practice. Meltzer succumbed to the same fallacy when he said: "The destruction
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B. Contract Breach and Arguably Protected Activity
We saw earlier that virtually every contract action in which
a union defends by denying that its strike was prohibited by the
contract sued upon involves activity arguably protected by section 7. By finding a broader strike ban in the agreement than
the Board would, a court could penalize conduct that the Board
would hold protected. Moreover, inconsistent determinations
could conceivably be rendered on the basis of the very same incident. The court's reading of a no-strike clause might lead it to
render judgment against the union, while the Board, reading the
clause as inapplicable to the strike in question, found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice for disciplining those
who participated in it.
Nevertheless, if anything is clear it is that Congress wanted the
courts to have jurisdiction over suits for breach of no-strike agreements. 87 There is no reason to believe that it wished virtually all
such suits to wait until the NLRB had first decided that the contract was broken and that the strike was therefore unprotected.
Such a procedure would be absurd, particularly since some employers would have no way of getting the matter before the
NLRB in the first place; only an employer powerful enough to
make disciplinary action stick would have reason to hope that
the union or an employee would charge him with an unfair labor
practice and thereby ultimately open the judicial forum to him.
Moreover, the courts, not the NLRB, were designated as the
primary forum for construction of collective agreements. Why,
then, should the courts wait for the NLRB's guidance as to what
an agreement means? Lucas Flour and Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref.
Co. were plainly right insofar as they decided that the courts
are free to construe no-strike clauses even though, in so doing,
they may impinge on protected activity.
However, as was noted above, the problem comes up somewhat
differently when the union's defense is that it struck in protest
against an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It
of judicial competence on the ground of contractual and statutory overlap . . .
would deprive litigants of a judicial remedy, which is often more expeditious and
comprehensive, because of the possible existence of a Board remedy which might
not be forthcoming and which, even if it were, might be inadequate." Meltzer,
supra note 49, at 283; see Dunau, supra note 77, at Si. Once again, it is hard
to see how this factor can keep the courts open to contract actions when it failed
to do so for tort actions. Other reasons must account for special treatment of
the contract action, and I respectfully submit that they are to be found in
the text.
"' See note 67 supra.
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has been argued that such cases are, for present purposes, indistinguishable from the garden variety action on a no-strike clause.88
The argument rests on the theory of the decisions holding unfairlabor-practice strikes protected though seemingly in breach of
contract. The Supreme Court has said that such strikes are protected because the ordinary no-strike clause is not intended to
apply to them. 9 Therefore, the argument has it, these cases are
just like those already discussed: whether the strike is protected
by section 7 depends on a construction of the agreement.
Notwithstanding the literal validity of the argument, the case
of the unfair-labor-practice strike is different. Suppose, for example, that a court is faced with an employer's suit on an agreement in which the union promised "to refrain from engaging in
any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement." "
The union concededly struck during the term of the agreement,
but it did so in protest against the dismissal of two employees
who had violated the employer's no-solicitation rule. The agreement obviously contains no exceptions for strikes against dismissals for soliciting union members, but under the Supreme
Court's Mastro Plastics decision it does contain an implicit exception for strikes against unfair labor practices. A court must
accordingly address itself to the question whether the employer's
no-solicitation rule violates section 8(a) (i), and if so, whether
that was the reason for the strike. In short, the court must think
about the NLRA rather than the agreement."1
Is that reason enough to make an exception for such cases and
apply the principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction? I think not,
although the argument for an exception has some force. The
court is, after all, explicitly construing the NLRA. Nevertheless,
to say that the courts cannot decide this case would seriously
weaken the right, which Congress wished employers to have, to
meaningful relief from breach of a collective agreement. Unions
could be expected to seize every colorable opportunity to plead
the defense of employer unfair labor practice. Even if the courts
required that such a defense be acted upon by the filing of a
charge with the NLRB, so that the union could not keep the
employer from court altogether, substantial delay would result
while the court waited for the Board to decide the unfair-labor" See Meltzer, supra note 49, at 29o-91.
89 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S.
90
91

Id. at

270

(1956).

281.

Cf. McLean Distrib. Co. v. Brewery & Beverage Drivers Local 993,

254

Minn. 204, 94 N.W.2d 514, cert. denied, 36o U.S. 917 (i959); Pattenge v. Wagner
Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
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practice issue. As Professor Meltzer has pointed out, "Delay is
particularly undesirable in connection with any action to enforce
collective bargaining agreements because of the adverse impact
of such action on the parties' continuing relationship and on subsequent negotiations." 92 In addition, to the extent that injunctive relief is obtainable in state-court actions,93 delay would obviously defeat the whole point of the suit.
In short, the courts should be permitted to decide whether a
strike was called in protest against an unfair labor practice when
that decision is necessary to determine whether the strike was in
breach of contract. Once again, then, Lucas Flour seems to have
been rightly decided.
C. Enforcement Would Arguably Compel the Commission
of an Unfair Labor Practice
We saw above that Lion Dry Goods apparently means that in
suits on collective agreements the courts are to ignore the defense
that the union lacked majority support when the agreement was
made. The courts are, then, to enforce a collective agreement
even though its execution may have violated sections 8(a) (i),
8(a)(2) and 8(b) (i),

and even though compelling the defend-

ant to honor it may require further violations of those sections.
There is no denying that if the union did in fact lack a majority,
a judicial decision to enforce its agreement would deprive individual workers of basic rights guaranteed by sections 7 and 8,
exactly the sort of result that preemption is intended to forestall.
Moreover, a decision to enforce could conceivably lead to actual
conflict with the NLRB.
Nevertheless, to permit this defense to oust a court of jurisdiction or to delay decision would seriously impede the enforcement of collective agreements. Many unions are still uncertified.
Deference to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction whenever the defense
of no majority was raised would leave them vulnerable to loss of
their contract rights or to attenuation of those rights through delay. The extent of the damage would depend on how the Supreme
Court's decision in Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
NLRB 11 were applied. That case allowed the Board only six
months from the date of execution to proceed against an employer
2 Meltzer, supra note 49, at 291.

93See note 52 supra; e.g., McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (i957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
"' See pp. 539-43 supra.

95 362 U.S. 411 (i96o).
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and a union for maintaining an agreement that was invalid when
made because the union lacked majority support. Even though
"the maintaining of such an agreement in force is a continuing
violation of the Act," 96 the Court said, a proceeding may not be
begun after six months since the "unfair labor practice cannot be
made out except by reliance on the fact of the agreement's original
unlawful execution, an event which, because of limitations, cannot
itself be made the subject of an unfair labor practice complaint . . . . 7 Sensible application of this principle to contract actions would seem to require that, whether or not deference
is paid to the NLRB, the no-majority defense is worthless six
months after execution. But it must be remembered that Garmon
makes no exceptions for cases in which a Board remedy is timebarred. The fact that a party can get no help from the Board
for reasons having nothing to do with the merits does not license
the courts to step in.98 Consequently, application of the primary
jurisdiction principle when the no-majority defense was raised
might leave many plaintiffs remediless. Whenever six months had
passed, the courts would be deferring to a tribunal powerless to
act. Properly applied then, Local Y424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
would mean that we need only be concerned about what courts
should do with the no-majority defense during the first six months
of an agreement; improperly applied, it makes deference to the
NLRB unthinkable.
Whatever is to be done with contracts past the age of six
months, uncertified unions with new agreements should not be
subject to dismissals or delays whenever an employer chooses to
question their representative status. Consequently, the courts
should not await Board adjudication of the no-majority defense.
96 Id. at 414.
97 Id. at 419.
98 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959):

To require the States to yield to the primary jurisdiction of the National
Board does not ensure Board adjudication of the status of a disputed
activity. . . . [T]he Board may also fail to determine the status of the
disputed conduct by declining to assert jurisdiction, or by refusal of the
General Counsel to file a charge [issue a complaint), or by adopting some
other disposition which does not define the nature of the activity with unclouded legal significance. This was the basic problem underlying our
decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1. In that case
we held that the failure of the National Labor Relations Board to assume
jurisdiction did not leave the States free to regulate activities they would
otherwise be precluded from regulating. It follows that the failure of the
Board to define the legal significance under the Act of a particular activity
does not give the States the power to act. In the absence of the Board's
clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or
of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not
for this Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction.
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Nor should they undertake to adjudicate it themselves, given the
special and difficult questions posed by representation disputes.
Accordingly, although far from satisfactory, the result apparently
reached in Lion Dry Goods seems the best of a bad lot: the nomajority defense should be deemed immaterial in a contract action.
Obviously, though, if the NLRB in an independent proceeding
upholds the employer's contention, the Board's decision should
control. This would mean dismissal of the contract suit if it were
still pending when the Board acted, or supersession of the court's
judgment if one had already been rendered.
Lion Dry Goods may also imply that a court asked to enforce
a collective agreement should reject all claims that enforcement
would require the commission of an unfair labor practice. On
that reading of the case, a court would, for example, be obliged
to order an employer to discharge an employee for failure to pay
dues in accordance with a union security clause even though the
clause arguably exceeded the limits of 8(a) (3). Cummings emphasizes another example - a union's attempt to compel an employer to apply their agreement to a new facility.99 Established
Board doctrine has it that unless the new facility is an "accretion"
to the existing unit, extension of the agreement deprives the employees in the new facility of their section 7 rights.100 Lion Dry
Goods may mean that, in determining whether the union is entitled to the relief requested, a court should be guided solely by
the agreement and not by whether application to the new facility
constitutes an unfair labor practice.
Any resolution of these problems will exact a heavy sacrifice
of competing values. To ignore the NLRA in accretion cases
risks depriving workers of rights guaranteed by sections 7 and 8.
So does allowing a court or arbitrator to determine what the
NLRA permits, for the law on this subject is difficult to apply.
Moreover, a decision to apply the agreement is quite likely to
° See Cummings, NLRB Jurisdiction and Labor Arbitration: "Uniformity"
vs. "IndustrialPeace," 12 LAB. L.J. 425, 428-29 (ig6i) ; cf. Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 5o L.R.R.M. 2740 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962), holding the courts impotent
to order arbitration of a grievance arising under a recognition clause's bargaining
unit description. The court regarded the dispute as "within the exclusive jurisdiction of N.L.R.B., which has the expertise to make clear the precise nature of the
bargaining units certified by it."
'0 See, e.g., Essex Wire Corp., 13o N.L.R.B. 450 (196I); Perry Coal Co., 125
N.L.R.B. 1256 (959), -modified, 284 F.2d 9IO (7th Cir. i96o), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 949 (ig6i); Illinois Malleable Iron Co., 12o N.L.R.B. 451 (I958), adhered to
on rehearing, 127 N.L.R.B. i5o9 (196o), -modified, 129 N.L.R.B. 1347 (1961), enforceinent denied sub nom. NLRB v. Appleton Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 202 (7th Cir.
1961) (on ground that newly acquired facility was an accretion to the existing
unit).
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give rise to actual conflict with the NLRB, for workers affected
by the decision may well turn to the Board for relief. Finally, a
decision extending the agreement could cause the employer exasperating and expensive difficulties. The employees in the new
facility may have their own union, a situation hardly conducive
to tranquil labor relations. Actual out-of-pocket losses could result if the agreement the employer is ordered to extend contains
a union-security agreement and he is obliged to dismiss someone
for nonpayment of dues. If the NLRB should then hold that the
new facility was not an accretion, it presumably has the power to
order the employer to make the discharged employee whole, notwithstanding the fact that the discharge was judicially compelled. 0 1
On the other hand, deference to the Board would often mean
considerable delay and trips to two forums before full relief
could be obtained. Delay could be a disaster for the union, particularly where the establishment of the new facility caused a
reduction in the work available to those in the existing unit.
The choice is not an easy one. If over-refinement were not
likely to create more problems than any blanket choice, I would
urge that we not attempt a single answer. I would, then, incline
to the view that only the Board should decide the accretion and
union-security problems. But I have already urged that the
courts ignore the defense that the union lacked a majority at the
time of execution, and the next subsection deals with another
cluster of instances in which I believe that the courts should risk
compelling the commission of unfair labor practices. And these
do not exhaust the possibilities. The desirability of avoiding uncertainty as to the proper forum until each fresh variation is
worked out seems to me to outweigh the conceded virtues of a
discriminating approach. A court should not, then, allow itself
to be frightened off by the defense that it is being asked to compel the commission of an unfair labor practice. For lack of a
better solution, it should decide the merits of that defense even
though its decision will be no proof against a superseding decision
by the Board.102
In sum, Dowd Box, Lucas Flour, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
and Lion Dry Goods seem to have been rightly decided. The
courts should not hesitate to enforce a collective agreement
merely because the conduct constituting the alleged breach is
101 See note 44 supra.
102 Once again, though, the no-majority defense should be rejected out
of hand.
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also an unfair labor practice; they should not hold back from
deciding whether a strike violates an agreement merely because
an arguable construction of that agreement might lead to the
strike's being held protected activity; and they should not be
deflected from enforcement by a claim that the union lacked
majority support when the agreement was made. In all of these
instances, the courts should proceed, for all practicable purposes,
as though the NLRA did not exist.
The Court was also on solid ground insofar as it indicated a
general reluctance to apply the principle of exclusive NLRB
jurisdiction to contract actions. Thus, the principle should not
be applied to deny the courts power to determine whether a
strike, allegedly in breach of contract, was protected activity because called in protest against an unfair labor practice. And,
while one cannot avoid some misgivings if the Court really meant
that primary jurisdiction has no place at all in suits on collective
agreements, so far at least we have discovered no clear error on
that score either. Even where defendant maintains that enforcement would compel the commission of an unfair labor practice, it
seems best to gamble on the courts' deciding that question correctly.
Some problems that the Court almost certainly did not consider when it uttered footnote 9 are our next concern.
D. Representative Status Arguably Lost After the Negotiation
of a Valid Agreement
Suppose that in the fourth year of a five-year collective agreement most of the employees subject to it elect to bolt their local
and affiliate with a competing union. What should a court do
if the old local sues to enforce its contract, and further, if the
new one claims that it is the only proper plaintiff? A new agreement between the employer and the successor union would complicate matters but would not significantly affect the primary
jurisdiction problem.
Meltzer, in his landmark article on preemption,'10 3 concluded
that where the NLRB has certified the successor union, the courts
should feel free to decide who has the right to enforce what contract. However, absent certification, he seems to favor exclusive
NLRB jurisdiction by a slight margin. Meltzer's first conclusion
is unassailable. The existence of the certification plus rather clear
indications from the Board that a defeated union can no longer
103 See

Meltzer, supra note 49, at 293-95.
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administer its contract 104 provide easy answers to the questions
most likely to be bungled by a court and therefore diminish the
probabilities both of unwitting subversion of protected rights and
of clash with the Board. 1 5 The case for primary jurisdiction, in
other words, is not particularly compelling. On the other side
of the balance, the case for permitting judicial decision is particularly strong because a refusal to decide might leave the certified union without a forum - the Board says that it will not determine the effect of its certification on an outstanding contract
in the course of a representation proceeding 06 and unless the employer has refused to bargain, no unfair-labor-practice proceeding will lie.
However, Meltzer's second conclusion, as he recognized, is
more doubtful. Exclusive NLRB jurisdiction would mean that
neither union could enforce contract rights against the employer
until the Board decided which of them was exclusive representative. In the great majority of circumstances, would not either
union be better for the employees than none at all? 107 The best
solution may be for the courts to reject the claim of an alleged
successor union during the term of another union's contract unless the successor comes armed with a certification. This may lead
to error, but at least the original union was presumably the choice
of the workers at one time. Consequently, relatively little harm
to rights protected by the NLRA is to be anticipated from con104 See, e.g., American Seating Co., io6 N.L.R.B. 250 (i953),

in which the

Board also held that the certified successor is entitled to insist that the employer
negotiate a new agreement even though the old purports to be unexpired. The
authorities are ably discussed in Freidin, The Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain,
59 Comiy. L. Rav. 6i, 82-92 (1959). Freidin is highly critical of American Seating for requiring the employer to negotiate anew before the old agreement has
expired; he would prefer to see the successor union merely entitled to take over
the administration of the outstanding agreement.
105 See, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
216 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1954), in which it was held, the court describing the law
as "crystal dlear," that a union cannot enforce the checkoff and union-shop
clauses of its agreement when another union has been certified before the agreement's expiration. The court also said: "Recognition of IAM [the contracting
union and loser in the certification election] after the election and certification
of CIO would have been unlawful. Since it is established that the bargaining
agent can be dispensed with or changed by the employees, it is evident that the
contract of 1948 after the election of 195o had to be administered by CIO." Id.
at 329.
100 See Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. goi (1958)') enforcement
denied on other grounds, 297 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 196). However, as Freidin,
supra note 104, points out, the Board did in fact say a great deal in the Hershey
Chocolate case about the effect of its certification on an outstanding agreement.
17 A glaring exception would be a suit to compel adherence to a union security
agreement.
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tinued recognition of that union until its contract expires or
the Board rules otherwise. Moreover, a refusal to enforce the
original union's agreement pending Board action could itself
subvert rights protected by the NLRA. Denial of the contractual
benefits obtained by a union now contending with another union
for worker loyalties could conceivably determine the outcome
in favor of the alleged successor. Although enforcement only
at the behest of the original union might tip the scales the other
way, that union would seem to have the better claim to legitimacy.
Similar problems may arise even after the original union's contract has expired. Contractual rights can persist beyond the term
of an agreement; Zdanok v. Glidden Co.'0 - with its determination that seniority rights are not necessarily limited by a
contract's term - is the most dramatic example, but hardly the
only one. Pensions, severance pay, and various welfare benefits all may survive the termination date of the agreement giving
rise to them. May the courts decide who is to enforce these
rights?
Once again no serious problem exists when a successor union
has been certified: the certified union should be permitted to
maintain the appropriate action." 9 Absent certification, enforcement by somebody still seems preferable to delaying all relief
until the NLRB acts. A successor union that has negotiated a
new agreement would seem to have the better claim and so the
courts should probably treat it as the proper plaintiff. Where no
new agreement has been negotiated, the least undesirable course
may be to allow the courts to grapple with the representation
question, subject to supersession by the Board.
Finally, when no successor union is involved, a problem may
still be posed if a union that has arguably lost its majority seeks
to enforce rights created by an expired contract. The simplest
answer would be to ignore the representation question and allow
the union to enforce those rights whether or not it still commands
majority support. It would, after all, have been entitled to enforce them during the term of the contract without regard to
whether it retained the majority support with which it started.
Fears about impingement on the right of employees not to have
an unwanted representative thrust upon them can be allayed by
permitting joinder of any employee who wishes to participate.
However, where the union has actually been decertified, it can
108 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. ig6i), affirmed on other grounds, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
"' Cf. Kenin v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 196o).
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no longer enforce rights arising out of its agreement, even though
no successor union has been chosen.110
E.

Representation Disputes Covered by No-Raiding
Agreements

Section 3o, it will be recalled, includes in its jurisdictional
grant suits for violation of contracts between labor organizations.
Accordingly, the federal courts would appear to have the power
to enforce a union's promise not to organize workers already being
represented by another union. However, the exercise of that
power creates a serious risk of head-on collision with the NLRB's
power over representation proceedings. The problem deserves
inclusion in this discussion because, calling as it does for exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, it teaches us something about the
limits of section 3oi's predominance over Garmon.
InternationalUnion of Doll & Toy Workers v. Metal Polishers
Union "I exemplifies the problem. Plaintiff and defendant unions
had executed a no-raiding agreement in which each had promised,
among other things, not to "seek to represent, or obtain the right
to represent" employees already being represented by the other
in an "established bargaining relationship." 112 Disputes arising
under the agreement were to be resolved by final and binding
arbitration. Subsequently, the Metal Polishers petitioned the
NLRB for certification in a unit then being represented by the
Doll and Toy Workers. The Doll and Toy Workers turned to
the arbitration forum and an award was rendered holding that
the agreement had been violated; this required the Metal Polishers to withdraw its petition for certification. It chose instead to
ignore the award and to ask the NLRB to proceed with an election. The Board obliged "1 and the Metal Polishers overwhelmed
the Doll and Toy Workers. The vanquished union then brought
suit to compel specific performance of the arbitration award. The
Metal Polishers and the Board maintained that the court lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter. Notwithstanding a decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granting relief
on essentially the same facts,114 Judge Mathes dismissed the action. His choice was a sensible one. The key factor distinguishing
See Retail Clerks v. Montgomery Ward, 5o L.R.R.M. 2702 (N.D. Ill. x962).
ill i8o F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. ig6o).
110

12

1 1d. at 281.
11 Unreported decision.
114

United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.

1958); cf. Local 26o8, Lumber Workers v. MiUmen's Local i495, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 169 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. x958).
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cases of this sort from all of the others discussed above is that
the enforceability of contracts is not diminished one whit by
deference to the Board. It has the power to grant the raided
union its full contractual rights. Its decision not to is attributable
to a substantive judgment, not to a deficiency of power.
To make the same point another way, while it will be small
consolation to the Doll and Toy Workers, it lost, not because
no forum was open to vindicate its rights, but because it had no
rights. The NLRB had rejected its contract right as subordinate
to the right of employees to free choice of a bargaining representative. In effect, the NLRB had decided that enforcement of
the no-raiding pact in question and probably of all no-raiding
pacts is contrary to the policy of the NLRA." 5
Although that decision has been effectively criticized,1" disagreement with it should not be confused with disagreement with
two very different propositions. First, I take it that somebody
should decide whether no-raiding pacts are a permissible limitation on free employee choice. And, second, I submit that Judge
Mathes correctly concluded that the Board is a more appropriate
agency than the courts to make that decision. Certainly, if the
Board held that no-raiding pacts should be honored in representation proceedings, no one would suggest that a district court could,
by holding one unenforceable, affect the Board's decision to the
contrary. More important, as Judge Mathes put it,
[T]here can be little doubt that the Congress expressly empowered
an administrative agency to deal with disputes as to employee
representation, because such matters invariably concern more
than the interests of the litigants themselves. The interests of the
public, of the industries affected, of the unions affected, as well
as the individual employees' right to choose freely their bargaining representatives, all must be considered. An administrative
agency, with its flexible procedures, is obviously better able to
evaluate all these competing interests, and to determine as well
the permissibility of non-raiding agreements in this area, than
is a court." 7
V. CONCLUSION

Predicting what the Supreme Court or the NLRB will do often
requires not wisdom, but patience. Sooner or later, if only for
101 Obviously, though, if a union voluntarily complies with a no-raiding
agreement, the NLRB cannot compel it to seek the right to represent.
"a' See Aaron, Interunion Representation Disputes and the NLRB, 36
L. REV. 846, 85x-56 (i958).
117

18o F. Supp. at 286.
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a little while, one is likely to be right. The prospect is too tempting: I submit that the Court will continue along the lines it
marked at the October i961 Term, that it will, as it said it
would, treat Garmon as "not relevant" in suits on collective
agreements."18
Once again, the disadvantages of this departure from primary
jurisdiction should not be overlooked: rights protected by section
7 may occasionally be subverted; and parties may suffer loss and
inconvenience when a court and the Board take the same situation
in hand and render conflicting orders. But these prospects should
not be exaggerated either. Some risk of erroneous decision inheres in any system of adjudication; allowing courts to proceed
with contract enforcement in cases in which the NLRA is somehow implicated will not often increase that risk substantially.
Loss and inconvenience from head-on conflict between Board and
court will be even rarer. In the great mass of cases clashing mandates are impossible.
Thus no clash can arise out of the most frequent cause of overlap between contract and NLRA -the contract breach that is
also a possible unfair labor practice. Even if the Board did not
defer to the arbitration process in such cases, no conflict would
ensue. Normally, there would not even be any inconsistency in
decision. For example, a Board decision that an employee is not
entitled to reinstatement because no case has been made that
his employer discriminated against him in violation of section
8 (a) (3) can easily be reconciled with an arbitrator's decision that
the same employee is entitled to reinstatement because no just
cause for discharge existed. When inconsistency does occur in
this class of cases - e.g., the Board believes the employer and
finds no violation of the statutory ban on antiunion discrimination,
11This would mean reversal for Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich.

350, io6 N.W.2d 785 (I96I), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 827 (1962), a decision
affirming the dismissal of a contract suit because of Garmon. Plaintiffs, members of the Newspaper Guild, brought an action claiming that their employer had
violated a collective agreement barring "discrimination against any employee
because of his membership or activity in the Guild." 362 Mich. at 351, io6
N.W.2d at 786. The Supreme Court of Michigan put the question presented this
way: "Does a State court have jurisdiction of an action at law by an employee
against his employer for breach of a contract between such employer and a labor
organization to which such employee belongs where the action is based upon
facts which if true would constitute both a breach of such contract and an unfair
labor practice under the provisions of section 8(a)" of the national labor relations
act as amended?" 362 Mich. at 353, io6 N.W.2d at 786. Relying heavily on
Garmon, the court held that state courts do not have jurisdiction over such an
action. At this writing, the case has been argued before the Supreme Court of
the United States but has not yet been decided.
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while the arbitrator finds the employer's testimony incredible
and holds that he violated the contractual ban on antiunion
discrimination- the employer will still not be in the position
of violating one order if he obeys the other. Compliance with the
arbitrator's award will get him into no difficulty with the Board.
The situation exemplified by Lucas Flour and Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co. is similarly free from the danger of a conflict in
orders. To be sure, the NLRB may, for example, order an employer to reinstate dismissed strikers because their strike was
not a breach of contract and so was protected, while a court,
reading the contract differently, holds that it was broken and
assesses damages against the union. This may be a bit startling,
and it would of course be better if one tribunal could adjudicate
all of the legal incidents of this single episode, but neither tribunal has jurisdiction to do so. Given that state of affairs, inconsistency in decision is not manifestly unfair, particularly since,
again, the employer can comply with the Board's order without
offending the court's.
It is only when we come to the cases in which requiring a party
to abide by the contract may require him to violate the NLRA
that real loss and inconvenience from conflicting decisions are to
be feared. The prospect of an employer's being ordered by a
court to dismiss an employee pursuant to a union security clause
and subsequently being ordered by the NLRB to reinstate that
employee with back pay is an ugly one. And this is not, of course,
the only situation in which a party to a contract might find himself victimized by clashing orders.
Nevertheless, several factors persuade me that, given the division of labor between Board and courts, we must accept this unpleasant hazard. First, actual clashes of this sort have in fact
been almost unheard of even though most courts and arbitrators
have regularly ignored Garmon in contract actions. Second, to
say that courts retain jurisdiction is not to say that they must
always exercise it. Where, for example, the Board has actually
issued a complaint against an employer and a union charging
them with the maintenance of an illegal union security agreement,
a court asked to enforce that clause would be well advised to
await the Board's decision. This would be a trivial interference
with the enforcement of contracts, as contrasted with the major
impediment represented by the principle that a court lacks jurisdiction to enforce an agreement whenever to do so would arguably
compel the commission of an unfair labor practice. This suggests
the third factor militating in favor of rejecting Garmon even
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when enforcing an agreement would arguably compel the commission of an unfair labor practice-the alternative would introduce uncertainties and delays that would gravely hamper the
enforcement of collective agreements. Garmon's ouster of the
courts, it must be emphasized, does not depend on actual clash
with the Board, or even on a substantial probability of clash. It
is sufficient that the NLRA arguably be involved, and we have
seen how easy it is to inject an arguable unfair labor practice into
a contract action.
In sum, Garmon cannot be applied to contract actions without
depriving parties of a forum for the expeditious settlement of their
contract claims. If for some definable class of cases involving
it can for suits on
collective agreements it could be said -as
the Board can give all that the courts
no-raiding pacts -that
can give, application of Garmon would be appropriate. But no
such class is apparent.
VI. POSTSCRIPT

Labor law waits for no man, least of all for printers. Since the
foregoing paper was written, its theme has been the subject of a
new Supreme Court decision' 1 9 and the Court has granted
certiorari in yet another relevant case. 20 Although neither of
these developments requires any modification of the substance of
the main paper, the compulsion to be current is overpowering.
Accordingly, I shall say a few words about them.
A summary of the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n and a prediction that it would be reversed
appear above.' 2 ' In brief, the Michigan court had relied heavily
on Garmon to conclude that state courts lack jurisdiction of an
action on a collective agreement "where the action is based upon
facts which if true would constitute both a breach of such contract
122 On December io, 1962,
and an unfair labor practice . .
the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Black dissenting, reversed.' 23 The Court was faithful to its practice of the
preceding term: it refused to apply Garmon to a suit on a collective agreement but said little about the reasons for the refusal.
v. Evening News Ass'n, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4041 (U.S. Dec. io, 1962).
120 Local 15o5, IBEW v. Local Lodge 1836, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 3o4 F.2d
119Smith

365 (ist Cir.), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3171 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1962) (No. 419).
12 See note 118 supra.
122 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich. 350, 353, io6 N.W.2d 785, 786
(1g6x).
123 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4041 (U.S. Dec. io, 1962).
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One paragraph in the text and one supporting footnote carry the
burden. The paragraph follows:
Lucas Flour and Dowd Box, as well as the later Atkinson v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, were suits upon collective bargaining contracts brought or held to arise under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act and in these cases the jurisdiction of
the courts was sustained although it was seriously urged that the
conduct involved was arguably protected or prohibited by the Labor
Management Relations Act and therefore within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. In Lucas Flour
as well as in Atkinson the Court expressly refused to apply the preemption doctrine of the Garmon case; and we likewise reject that
doctrine here where the alleged conduct of the employer, not only
arguably, but concededly, is an unfair labor practice within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The authority
of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also
violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301,
but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the
courts in suits under § 301. If, as respondent strongly urges, there
are situations in which serious problems will arise from both the
courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts which amount to
an unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases when they arise.
This is not one of them, in our view, and the National Labor
124
Relations Board is in accord.
The supporting footnote reports that an amicus brief filed on
behalf of the NLRB urged the result reached and that the Board
has in the past declined jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
"where, in its judgment, federal labor policy would best be served
by leaving the parties to other processes of the law." 12
The remainder of the Court's opinion is devoted to demonstrating why this discussion controls an action on a collective agreement brought by an individual employee. The reason, the Court
explains, is that a suit on a collective agreement arises under
section 301 no matter by whom brought.' 26 Garmon, then, can
no more block an individual's suit on a collective agreement than
it can a union's or an employer's. Once again, though, we are told
little about why it cannot block a union's or an employer's.
Several weeks before deciding Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
the Court granted certiorari in Local x505, IBEW v. Local
124 Id. at 4041-42.
15 Id. at 4042 n.6.

'26 This aspect of the decision has a number of noteworthy aspects, not the
least of which is the long-anticipated overruling of Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (i95s).
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27
That action arose out
Lodge 1836, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists.1

of a claim by the Machinists that the recognition clause of its
agreement with the company entitled its members to certain work
being done by members of the IBEW. The company rejected the
demand and refused to arbitrate the matter. A district court decision ordering it to arbitrate was reversed by the Court of
NLRB had
Appeals for the First Circuit on the ground that12the
8
controversy.
the
resolve
to
jurisdiction
exclusive
The case is a hard one. The difficulty stems from doubts about
which tribunal

-

court or Board -

can deal more definitively

with the work assignment dispute. Let us consider first the
choices left to the Machinists by the court's decision to dismiss.
It could, as the court apparently wished, petition the NLRB for
a clarification of its certification to cover the work in question. If
the Machinists prevailed in such a proceeding, it would obtain the
right to represent those doing the work in question. That, however,
would be only half the battle. The Machinists' interest was not
merely in representation; it was claiming a contractual right to
oust those doing the work so that its members could take their
places. Whether this end would be achieved by a clarification of
its certification would depend on other factors. Chief among these
would be the existence of a seniority clause and how it was applied
to those doing the disputed jobs. The Machinists would presumably maintain that as newcomers to its bargaining unit, the holders
of the disputed jobs were junior to everyone else in the unit.
Therefore, if any other members of the unit were on layoff, they
would have the right to replace the newcomers. If this view prevailed, either in negotiations with the employer or in arbitration,
the Machinists would have achieved everything it set out to
achieve.
However, the number of "ifs" on the path to that relief might
well deter the Machinists from pursuing it. In particular, fresh
litigation might be necessary to obtain a determination of the
seniority status of the newcomers and the Machinists would have
to reckon with the possibility that the determination would be
adverse to it. Moreover, clarification of certification would do the
Machinists no good at all if it were seeking the jobs in question
for members without prior service with this employer. The
Machinists might, therefore, prefer another course. Section io (k)
12731 U.S.L. WEEK 3171 (U.S. Nov. ig, 1962) (No. 419).
128 Local IgO5, IBEW v. Local Lodge 1836, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 304
F.2d 365 (Ist Cir. 1962).

19631

PRIMARY JURISDICTION

of the NLRA directs the NLRB to resolve a work assignment dispute whenever someone charges that such a dispute has given rise
to a violation of section 8(b) (4)(D).' 2 9 The Supreme Court has
decided that this means that the Board must decide who is entitled
to do the work in controversy. 130 If, then, the Machinists could
provoke the filing of an 8(b) (4) (D) charge against it, it could
obtain a determination of the sort it seeks. A threat to strike to
compel assignment of the work to it, like an actual strike for the
same purpose, would be sufficient to support such a charge, but
the employer might refrain from filing one nevertheless: for
example, the threat may not seem credible to the company and
it may prefer that the work remain subject to the other union's
agreement. The Machinists might, then, actually have to strike
to get the determination for which it initially came to court.
If, instead of dismissing, the court of appeals had affirmed the
lower court's order compelling the employer to arbitrate with the
Machinists, a different set of uncertainties would have come into
play. Victory for the Machinists in the ensuing arbitration proceeding would presumably have moved the IBEW, the other
interested union, to action. It, in turn, might have chosen to invoke the arbitration clause of its agreement, to petition the NLRB
for clarification of its certification, or to violate 8(b) (4) (D) in
order to obtain a io(k) determination. In any event, ordering
the employer to arbitrate with the Machinists would plainly not
have ended the matter.
12 Section

io(k) provides: "Whenever it is charged that any person has

engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D)
of section 8(b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the
dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within
ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute
submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed
upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by
the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary
adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed."
Section 8(b) (4) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or . . .to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or
certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees
performing such work . . ."
13
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573 (1963).
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In general, then, perhaps the courts should refuse to order arbitration of a work assignment dispute whenever only one of the
contending unions would be a party to the arbitration proceeding.
Whatever difficulties recourse to the NLRB may pose, that forum
can produce a definitive, peaceful solution at least some of the
time. An arbitration proceeding with one of the vitally interested
parties missing holds no such promise.
However, it is at least arguable that the IBEW-Machinists dispute under discussion involved a special set of circumstances. The
IBEW asked the court to allow it to participate in the Machinists'
arbitration with the employer if arbitration were ordered. The
Machinists, as the party seeking equitable relief, would seem to
have no valid complaint if that relief included provision for the
protection of the rights of the IBEW; consequently, as far as the
Machinists was concerned, the order to arbitrate could fairly have
been conditioned on the IBEW's being permitted to participate
in the arbitration proceeding. Nor would any right of the employer seem to be overridden by an order so conditioned. Each of
its collective agreements contained an arbitration clause; each of
the unions, then, had a contractual right to arbitrate the issue in
dispute with the company; if consolidation of the ensuing arbitration proceedings is necessary to make those rights meaningful, no
contract principles would seem to be offended by such a consolidation. In short, the court of appeals probably could have issued
an order that would have permitted an arbitrator to settle the right
to the disputed work with all of the interested parties before it.
What harm was to be apprehended from this course? The court
feared that "a decision by the arbitrator in IAM's favor, if erroneous, would invade IBEW's certification." ' The risk seems a
nominal one. The work in question was almost certainly marginal,
of a sort that the Board could just as well have assigned to the
unit represented by the Machinists as to the one represented by
the IBEW. An arbitration award either way, then, would not
make much difference to the NLRB. A more serious problem
would arise if the Machinists prevailed at arbitration and the
IBEW members, dismissed as a result, brought unfair labor practice proceedings against the company for discriminating against
them for lack of membership in the Machinists.' 3 2 The company
might then be held liable for doing only what an arbitration award
31 304 F.2d

at 367.

132 Section 8(a) (3)

of the NLRA would be the arguably applicable provision.

It is quoted in note 5 supra.
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had compelled it to do. There is, however, good reason to believe
that the employer is not liable under these circumstances.' 3 3 On
this view, the court should have granted the Machinists' prayer
for arbitration, on condition that the Machinists consent to the
IBEW's being made a party to the arbitration proceeding.
133 The conclusion that no unfair labor practice has been committed may well

follow from NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573 (i961);
and see Administrative Decision of the General Counsel, Case No. SR-297, i96o
CCH N.L.R.B. 1] 868o refusing to issue an unfair-labor-practice complaint on a
charge filed by several individuals who had been laid off when their work was
taken from them and assigned to craftsmen who were members of a different
union. The charging employees' union and the union to which their replacements
belonged had an agreement for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes. When
the instant dispute arose, the employer agreed to abide by the unions' resolution
of the controversy and the charging employees were dismissed pursuant to that
resolution. "Since the alleged discrimination occurred as the result of employer's decision to abide by the resolution of the two unions, General
Counsel deemed further proceedings unwarranted." Also relevant is the
NLRB's recent decision in International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
No. 88 (1962): the trial examiner had found the employer and union
guilty of unfair labor practices for enforcing a union-shop clause against a particular employee; they had enforced it only after an arbitration award had been
rendered upholding the union's position that it could validly be enforced; the
Board reversed the trial examiner, saying: "If complete effectuation of the federal
policy [favoring arbitration] is to be achieved, we firmly believe that the Board,
which is entrusted with the administration of one of the many facets of national
labor policy, should give hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process as 'part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself,' and voluntarily withhold
its undoubted authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice charges involving the same subject matter, unless it clearly appears that the arbitration
proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural
irregularities or that the award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act." And see note 86 supra. Perhaps, then, the Board will refuse even
to consider whether an unfair labor practice has been committed when an
employer acts pursuant to an arbitration award resolving a work assignment
dispute, unless, of course, the award is clearly contaminated by one of the deficiencies listed at the end of the passage just quoted.

